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1049 
The Coptic Church in Egypt: A Comment on 
Protecting Religious Minorities from Nonstate 
Discrimination∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the dawn of modern democracy in the Middle East during 
the last century . . . . the Copts live everywhere side by side with 
their Muslim neighbours without discrimination, either political or 
racial; they enjoy their religious freedom, and their churches in-
crease throughout Egypt. In sum, the Copts have survived as a reli-
gious entity, otherwise completely integrated within the body poli-
tic of the Egyptian nation, sharing the privileges and responsibilities 
of all citizens irrespective of faith or creed.1 
In 1998, exactly thirty years after this statement was authored, the 
International Coptic Federation took out a full-page advertisement 
in the Washington Post complaining that the Egyptian Copts were 
“experiencing . . . the worst hardships in their modern history.”2 
More specifically, the advertisement complained of government “re-
strictions on church activities, discrimination in political, academic 
and military affairs, rape and forced conversion of Coptic girls and 
requirements that Copts pay protection money.”3 A similar adver-
tisement, taken out in the New York Times a month earlier, accused 
the Egyptian government of turning a blind eye to atrocities com-
mitted against the Copts by nonstate actors.4 In response to these al-
legations, a panel of New York religious leaders visited Egypt in 
March 1998. At the conclusion of their visit, the panel 
 
 
∗   I dedicate this Comment to my father, S. Kent Brown—a true believer in religious 
pluralism, a scholar of the Middle East, and a dear friend to both Copts and Muslims. 
1.  AZIZ S. ATIYA, A HISTORY OF EASTERN CHRISTIANITY 16-17 (1968). 
2.  Christians of Egypt (The Copts), Descendants of the Pharaohs, Have No Place In Mod-
ern Egypt!, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1998, at A5. 
3.  Copts Are Full Egyptians Citizens: Presidential Advisor, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Mar. 
29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2250795. 
4.   See The Luxor Massacre: Not the Problem, Just a Symptom . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
1998, at A18. 
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noted several problem areas, including the delays of building per-
mits for new churches and for halting the deterioration of ancient 
churches. But the panel attributed the problem more to an en-
trenched bureaucracy than to prejudice. 
The report also found Christians are underrepresented in the gov-
ernment and that institutional discrimination exists in business, the 
military and universities. 
It concluded that although individual acts of violence exist, the 
government does not condone them.5 
In short, the panel found “‘no evidence of organized persecution’ 
against Coptic Christians in Egypt.”6 
This Comment analyzes the issues raised by the panel of religious 
leaders, with particular focus on the Egyptian government’s affirma-
tive duty to protect their Coptic citizens from discrimination by non-
state actors. Part II of this Comment describes the historical back-
ground of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt and discusses some 
of the recent events in Egypt that have led to the increase of nonstate 
discrimination against the Copts. Part III sets up the legal framework 
for analyzing the Egyptian government’s affirmative duty to protect 
Copts from nonstate discrimination. Central to this framework is 
Egypt’s role in the United Nations and its coinciding obligations to 
establish and protect the religious human rights of its Coptic citi-
zens.7 Applying the framework set forth in Part III, Part IV analyzes 
current acts of nonstate discrimination against Copts in Egypt and 
concludes that, despite the fact that the Egyptian government does 
not “condone” these acts and has fought against the more violent 
nonstate actors, Egypt cannot create a society truly tolerant of reli-
gious pluralism and thereby permanently protect Copts from non-
 
5.  Amy Worden, Panel Clears Egyptians of Targeting Christians, PORTLAND 
OREGONIAN, Mar. 27, 1998, at A09, available in 1998 WL 4193423. 
6.  Richard Engel, Egypt Denies Persecuting Christians, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1998, at 
A12. The International Coptic Federation took out a third advertisement in the Washington 
Post after the report was issued. See The Copts (Christians of Egypt) Don’t Have a Problem, The 
Copts Have Problems!, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1998, at A11. This advertisement “posed 18 
questions, citing cases where Copts, who number about 10 million, continuously face dis-
crimination from Egyptian laws that, for example, restrict the building of churches.” George 
Hishmeh, Letter from America, MIDEAST MIRROR, May 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 
27568413. 
7.  See infra Part III. 
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state discrimination without first eliminating all forms of religious 
discrimination from its own Constitution, courts, and legislation. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
An analysis of post-1970 nonstate religious discrimination affect-
ing Copts in Egypt and the government’s affirmative duty to protect 
the Copts from such discrimination requires a perfunctory under-
standing of the history of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt. 
Accordingly, Part II.A discusses the formation and early history of 
the Coptic Church. Part II.B focuses on the first laws that Muslims 
established that affected Coptic Christians after the Islamic invasion 
of Egypt in A.D. 640. Part II.C discusses important events in the last 
150 years of Egypt’s history that have given rise to the current situa-
tion of nonstate religious discrimination against the Copts. These 
three parts provide the historical context necessary to analyze the 
Egyptian government’s affirmative duty to protect the Copts from 
nonstate religious discrimination. 
A. Brief History of the Origins of Coptic Christianity 
The Copts8 trace their Christian roots to the time that the Holy 
Family fled Bethlehem and took refuge in Egypt.9 Copts claim that 
their church was founded between A.D. 55 and A.D. 61 by Saint 
Mark in Alexandria, Egypt.10 According to legend, 
on entering the city [Alexandria] by the eastern gate, [Saint Mark] 
broke the strap of his shoe. So he went to a cobbler to mend it. 
When the cobbler took an awl to work on it, he accidentally 
pierced his hand and cried aloud: ‘Heis ho Theos’ (God is one). 
Mark rejoiced at this utterance and, after miraculously healing the 
 
8.  On the word “Copt” and their ethnic origin, it is said: 
The words Copt and Egyptian are identical in meaning, and both are derivatives 
from Greek ‘aigyptos’. . . . The Arabs called Egypt ‘dar al-Qibt’, home of the Copts, 
and since the original natives of the land were Christians, the words Coptic and 
Christian became interchangeable in the Arab mind. . . . 
  Ethnically, the Copts are neither Semitic nor Hamitic, but rather Mediterra-
nean. They have been described as the direct descendents of the ancient Egyptians 
and some attempts have been made to prove their similarity to those distant dwellers 
on the Nile. 
ATIYA, supra note 1, at 16. 
9.  See generally O.E.A. MEINARDUS, IN THE STEPS OF THE HOLY FAMILY FROM 
BETHLEHEM TO UPPER EGYPT (1963).  
 10. See ATIYA, supra note 1, at 27. 
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man’s wound, took courage and gave the lesson to the hungry ears 
of his first convert. This happened to be Anianus, Mark’s successor 
as the second patriarch of Alexandria. The spark was fired, and the 
cobbler took the Apostle home with him. He and his family were 
baptized, and many others followed.11 
As a result of the large number of conversions, rumors arose that “a 
Galilean was in the city preparing to overthrow the [pagan] idols.”12 
These rumors, and the ensuing hostilities toward Christians, influ-
enced Saint Mark’s decision to leave Egypt for several years.13 Upon 
his return to Egypt in A.D. 68, however, he was lynched by “pa-
gans” and dragged through the streets of Alexandria on a rope until 
he died.14 
After Saint Mark’s death, the Alexandrian Christians avoided 
public exposure in hopes of eluding further persecution.15 In fact, 
except for naming the ten successive Alexandrine patriarchs that fol-
lowed Anianus’s death, there is little or no historical mention of the 
Christians in Egypt from A.D. 68 to A.D. 202.16 Between A.D. 202 
and A.D. 313, however, most of the pagan emperors of Rome 
sought out and killed many Christians, including the Copts.17 This 
Christian persecution reached its height in the Roman Empire dur-
ing the reign of Emperor Diocletian (A.D. 284-305), who ordered 
all Christian churches closed and Christian literature destroyed.18 
Diocletian also dismissed Christians from all state offices.19 A sizable 
number of Christians throughout the empire attempted to unify and 
fight against Diocletian, but their resistance was met with “a most 
formidable wave of persecution and martyrdom.”20 Among all Chris-
tians, the Coptic Egyptians tended to fare the worst. According to  
 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Aziz S. Atiya, Saint Mark, in 5 THE COPTIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 1528, 1530 (Aziz 
S. Atiya ed., 1991) [hereinafter Atiya, Saint Mark]. 
 13. See ATIYA, supra note 1, at 27. 
 14. See Atiya, Saint Mark, supra note 12, at 1531. 
 15. See ATIYA, supra note 1, at 29. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See generally id. 
 18. See W.H.C. Frend, Diocletian, in 3 THE COPTIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 904, 907 (Aziz S. 
Atiya ed., 1991). 
 19. See id. 
 20. ATIYA, supra note 1, at 31. 
BRO-FIN.DOC 10/31/00  4:54 PM 
1049] The Coptic Church in Egypt 
 1053 
the church, when the reign of terror ended21 there were some 
144,000 to 800,000 Coptic martyrs.22 
The famous “Edict of Milan,” issued in A.D. 313 by Constantine 
the Great put an end to Christian persecution.23 In A.D. 323, Con-
stantine adopted Christianity as the state religion.24 At this time, Al-
exandrian Christianity, now known as the Coptic Church, “became 
the light of the [Christian] world” because of its significant contribu-
tions to Christian theology and monasticism.25 The light began to 
dim, however, as theological and calendric rifts arose between the 
different Christian sects.26 These theological and calendric differences 
resulted both in a division between the eastern, or “Orthodox,” 
church and the western, or “Catholic,” church, as well as important 
theological differences between the Orthodox churches of Constan-
tinople and Alexandria.27 Today, while the Coptic Church belongs to 
the larger “Orthodox” church headquartered in Istanbul, it is gov-
erned by its own patriarch, typically referred to as the Coptic Pope.28 
Most Egyptian Copts are “Orthodox Copts” and adhere to the Cop-
tic patriarch. Some Egyptian Copts, however, are still loyal to the 
Roman Catholic Church and are called “Catholic Copts.” The Egyp-
tian government estimates today that Copts of both varieties make 
up about ten percent of Egypt’s population.29 
 
 21. Id. (“[T]he persecution inaugurated by Diocletian was sustained by Maximinus Daia 
(A.D. 305-13), his successor in the East.”). 
 22. See id.  
 23. Randall Stewart, Constantine I, in 2 THE COPTIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 588, 588-89 
(Aziz S. Atiya ed., 1991). 
 24. See ATIYA, supra note 1, at 32. 
 25. Id. at 33 (“The venerable fathers of the Coptic Church, the great theologians of the 
Catechetical School of Alexandria, the Coptic saints and heretics, the founders of monasticism, 
all these and numerous other illustrious Copts made permanent contributions to the estab-
lishment of the [Christian] faith.”). 
 26. See id. at 56, 69 (stating that “first great schism” of Christianity was a result of “the 
Chalcedon decisions in 451. . . . The East was branded by the West as Monophysite, while the 
West was described by the East as Diophysite. The rise of the so-called ‘Monophysitism’ in the 
East was of course led by the Copts of Egypt.”) For a further discussion of this “schism” and 
its effects see id. at 72-75. It should also be noted that at this time Constantinople had not yet 
become the seat of the Eastern Church. 
 27. See id. at 72. 
 28. See id. at 122-23. 
 29. See Christians Feel Under Siege in the Mideast, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at A1, 
available in 1997 WL 2237875 (“Copts are by far the largest Christian population in the 
Middle East . . . . The number of Christians in the Middle East is subject to some debate. No 
one has precise figures, in part because Egypt and Lebanon, the two countries with the largest 
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B. The Rise of Islam in Egypt and Its Legal Effects on the Copts 
At the time of the Islamic invasion in A.D. 640,30 the Egyptians, 
and particularly the Copts, were weary of religious and political per-
secution by their Byzantine oppressors.31 Indeed, many Copts wel-
comed the Muslim invaders and supported their cause against the 
Byzantines.32 
The new Muslim rulers gave the Egyptians two choices: either 
convert to Islam or pay the jizyah, a monetary tax on non-Muslims.33 
This tax precipitated a few rebellions, but eventually the Egyptians 
either converted to Islam to avoid paying the jizyah3 4 or willingly 
paid the jizyah.35 Those who paid the jizyah were called dhimmis, a 
term used to describe the “protected” status of non-Muslims living 
in a Muslim country.36 In addition to the jizyah tax, dhimmis were 
subject to other forms of discrimination. For example, Muslims were 
forbidden from hiring dhimmis3 7 and, at times, imposed external re-
 
Christian populations, have not released recent censuses. The Coptic hierarchy in Egypt, for 
instance, routinely speaks of there being 10 million to 12 million Christians . . . . But the 
Egyptian government usually says Copts make up 10% or less of the population—fewer than 6 
million people.”). 
 30. See ATIYA, supra note 1, at 80. 
 31. See generally id. at 75-78; see also JACQUES TAGHER, CHRISTIANS IN MUSLIM 
EGYPT: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN COPTS AND MUSLIMS FROM 
640 TO 1922, at 4-7 (S. Kent Brown ed. & Ragai N. Makar trans., 1998). 
 32. See TAGHER, supra note 31, at 7, 29. Tagher writes, 
For some time, the native population believed that the victory of the Muslims would 
help Christianity. . . . 
. . . . 
[But] [b]y and large, the Copts were unable to receive the Arabs as liberators be-
cause the invaders belonged to a different religion. It is true that the Arabs liberated 
them from the Byzantine yoke. But they were never comfortable with rulers who 
adopted a religion other than Christianity. 
Id. 
 33. See ATIYA, supra note 1, at 83. 
 34. See id. Perhaps not surprisingly, conversions to Islam “became so frequent that at 
one point the Muslim governors seemed to discourage steady conversion in order to protect 
the state revenue.” Id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See TAGHER, supra note 31, at 36. 
 37. See id. at 36-37. Tagher quotes the following passage from the Qur’an: 
“Let not believers take disbelievers for intimate friends in preference to believers.” 
“O ye who believe, take not Jews and Christians as your helpers, for they are helpers 
of one another. Whoso from among you takes them as helpers will indeed be one of 
them. Verily, Allah guides not the unjust people.” How can there be a guarantee for 
the others, who, if they were to prevail against you, would have no regard for any tie 
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strictions on them, such as requirements on how they should dress.38 
Eventually, the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims liv-
ing in Islamic countries came to be governed by the shari´a. The 
shari´a  
was not developed until the second or third centuries of Islam. . . . 
[and] is not a formally enacted legal code. It consists of a vast body 
of jurisprudence in which individual jurists express their views on 
the meaning of the Qur’an and Sunna and the legal implications of 
those views.39  
The shari´a is about much more than just the relationship of Mus-
lims and non-Muslims—it covers all of life. 
Fortunately, other than requiring the Copts to pay the jizyah, the 
Muslim rulers in Egypt largely ignored the harsh rules of their reli-
gious leaders outside of Egypt, as set forth in the shari´a, and treated 
the Copts with relative dignity.40 In fact, at times, the Copts reaped 
significant benefits from the Muslim Conquest: 
In the local administration [the Copts] monopolized the govern-
ment offices. They became the only scribes, tax collectors and mag-
istrates. A revival of Coptic culture also filled the vacuum created 
by the sudden disappearance of Byzantine influence. . . . Christian 
 
of kinship or pact with respect to you. They seek to please you with words, which 
their hearts repudiate; most of them are perfidious. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 38. See id. at 41-42. The external restrictions could be quite cruel. On one occasion, the 
caliphs were told: 
“To facilitate the collection of the jizyah, it is advisable to afix sealable rings on the 
necks of those liable to pay it . . . . After the completion of the collection, the rings 
may be removed upon request. They should not be permitted to emulate Muslims 
in clothes, in riding horses and donkeys, or in their general appearance. They should 
wear girdles that resemble thick drapes tied around their waists. They should fix a 
wooden ball in the shape of a pomegranate [on their saddles] instead of the saddle 
bow, and double-lace their sandals, and should not emulate Muslims. Their women 
should not be permitted to ride on saddles. . . . They should be permitted to live in 
the towns of Muslims and in their streets, to buy and sell anything except wine and 
pigs, and not to make a display of their crosses in the towns. They should wear long 
roundish caps. Order your governors to require the dhimmis to adopt this dress.” 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 39. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political 
Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 18-19 (1990) [hereinafter 
An-Na’im, Human Rights]. 
 40. See generally ATIYA, supra note 1, at 83-84. There were a few Muslim rulers who 
treated the Copts quite poorly. The most infamous of which is al-Hakim bi-’Amr Allah. See, 
e.g., TAGHER, supra note 31, at 100-09. 
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disabilities, such as the imposition of a distinctive dress or the pro-
hibition from horse riding, were rarely enforced.41 
Nevertheless, prior to the European law reforms beginning in 1850, 
the Copts never enjoyed full equality with their Muslim neighbors, 
and they were forced to give up numerous material privileges to keep 
up their “spiritual heritage.”42 
C. Events in Egypt Between 1850 and 1970 Giving Rise to Current 
Nonstate Discrimination Against the Copts 
Egypt retained its strong Islamic heritage in both its society and 
law until the European legal reforms between 1850 and 1950.43 As 
pertaining to religious freedom, the two most important legal re-
forms during this time concerned the enactment of an Egyptian 
Constitution and a legal code. Egypt’s first Constitution, which was 
enacted in 1923 and lasted until 1953,44 proclaimed: 
All Egyptians are equal before the law. They enjoy impartially civil 
and political rights, and are equally subject to public duties and re-
sponsibilities, without any distinction of race, language or religion. 
They alone are eligible for public office, civil and military; foreign-
ers are not eligible for these offices save in exceptional cases deter-
mined by law.45 
Liberty of religious opinion is absolute.46 
The State protects, in accordance with the practice established in 
Egypt, the free exercise of the rites of all religions and creeds, on 
condition that they are not prejudicial to public order or morality.47 
 
 
 
 41. ATIYA, supra note 1, at 84. 
 42. See id. at 92. 
 43. See generally J.N.D Anderson, Law Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950, in POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EGYPT 209 (P.M. Holt ed., 1968). 
 44. See ROBERT L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 71-72 (1995). 
 45. EGYPT CONST. (Royal Rescript No. 42 of Apr. 30, 1923) art. 3, reprinted in AMOS 
J. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 721-22 (1950) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF 
1923]. 
 46. Id. art. 12. 
 47. Id. art. 13. 
BRO-FIN.DOC 10/31/00  4:54 PM 
1049] The Coptic Church in Egypt 
 1057 
No restriction may be imposed upon the free use of any lan-
guage . . . in religious matters. . . .48 
These articles in Egypt’s 1923 Constitution helped solidify the toler-
ance of religious pluralism that had developed under the European 
legal reforms. 
The enactment of Egypt’s legal code took place in 194849 and 
was modeled after the French code.50 Although an Explanatory 
Memorandum to the code declares that many of the “general provi-
sions” and “detailed provisions” were derived from the shari´a,51 the 
code’s author admitted that, instead of the shari´a, three-fourths or 
five-sixths of the new legal code was “‘based on the decisions of 
Egyptian courts and the existing legislation.’”52 Nevertheless, the ex-
plicit reference to the shari´a in the explanatory memorandum was 
proof near the end of the European legal reforms that Egypt was be-
ginning to return to its pro-Islamic traditions. 
In 1952, the political face of Egypt changed dramatically. Led by 
a young Lt. Colonel named Gamal Abdel Nasser, a group of dis-
gruntled military officers, called the Free Officers, took over the gov-
ernment of Egypt in the Colonel’s Revolution.53 Within two years, 
the British, who had occupied Egypt since 1882, were finally and 
completely forced out of Egypt, and Nasser was elected as the coun-
try’s president.54 
 
 48. Id. art. 16. It should be noted that the Egyptian Constitution was modeled after 
Belgian and Ottoman models. See Anderson, supra note 43, at 224. 
 49. Anderson, supra note 43, at 224-227. 
 50. See id. at 226. 
 51. See id. at 227. One reason the explanatory memorandum may have been issued was 
in response to a counter-movement that was developing among Egypt’s lower-middle class 
Muslims, called the Muslim Brotherhood. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, An Islamic Alternative in 
Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat, in EGYPT, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: TWELVE 
CRITICAL ESSAYS 35 (1996) [hereinafter Ibrahim, An Islamic Alternative]. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, which advocates Islamist views, was established in 1928 and has been oriented 
towards changing society to conform with Islamic values as defined by the shari´a . See id. at 
35, 39 (“In this sense the MB is to be distinguished from Sufi and retreatist movements. The 
latter are individual-oriented, seeking human salvation by minimum involvement in societal 
affairs and maximum spiritual unity with God.”). The primary purpose of the Muslim Brother-
hood is to reinstate the shari´a as the central and most important legal text in Egypt. See id. at 
38. 
 52. Anderson, supra note 43, at 227. 
 53. See DEREK HOPWOOK, EGYPT: POLITICS AND SOCIETY 1945-1981, at 37-45 
(1982). 
 54. See id. at 41. Nasser’s reign covered historically meaningful moments like the Suez 
Canal crisis, Egypt’s alliance with Russia, and Egypt’s bitter defeat in the six-day war with Is-
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The 1923 Constitution was one of the first casualties of Nasser’s 
takeover. In 1953, a revolutionary command council abrogated the 
1923 Constitution and proclaimed Egypt a republic.55 In 1956, a 
new constitution was created that established a restricted national as-
sembly, a cabinet, and Nasser as the president.56 Between 1956 and 
1964, Nasser’s government continued to revise and amend Egypt’s 
Constitution.57 None of these revisions, however, gave the shari´a an 
important role in Egypt’s laws.58 Nor is there is any evidence that the 
religious human rights of the Copts were violated because of these 
constitutional revisions.59 
In 1970, President Nasser died, and President Mohammed An-
war El-Sadat succeeded him.60 At the start of his presidency, Sadat 
asked Egypt’s national assembly “to draft a constitution that outlined 
certain basic [legal] principles.”61 In addition, the Federation of Arab 
Republics, consisting of Libya, Syria, and Egypt, required each coun-
try to conform its constitution to the federation’s terms.62 These two 
factors led to the adoption of a new constitution on September 11, 
1971.63 In addition to retaining the 1956 Constitution’s “authoritar-
ian style” and single-party system, the Constitution of 1971 included 
a clause stating that “the principles of Islamic Shari´a law shall be a 
main source of legislation.”64 
By establishing the shari´a as “a main” source of legislation, the 
new constitution was a sign of unfortunate confrontations to come 
between the Copts and Islamists. In 1971, Pope Kyrillos VI (the 
Coptic Patriarch) died and Pope Shenouda III succeeded him.65 
 
rael. See generally id.; RAYMOND FLOWER, NAPOLEON TO NASSER: THE STORY OF MODERN 
EGYPT (1972). 
 55. See MADDEX, supra note 44, at 72. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See NADIA RAMSIS FARAH, RELIGIOUS STRIFE IN EGYPT: CRISIS AND IDEOLOGICAL 
CONFLICT IN THE SEVENTIES 1 (1986). 
 61. MADDEX, supra note 44, at 72. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id.; see also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Religious Freedom in Egypt: Under the 
Shadow of the Islamic Dhimma System, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
NATIONS AND RELIGIONS 43, 46 (Leonard Swidler ed., 1986) [hereinafter An-Na’im, Reli-
gious Freedom].  
 65. See FARAH, supra note 60, at 1. 
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Pope Shenouda’s strong personality and unwillingness to compro-
mise angered many of the more conservative Muslims in Egypt. For 
example, in Alexandria in 1972, pamphlets were distributed over the 
entire city, “claiming that Pope Shenouda was aggressively conduct-
ing a missionary campaign to convert Muslims to Christianity.”66 
The pamphlets also claimed that the Pope was planning a takeover of 
Egypt, which prompted many riots and demonstrations decrying this 
“alleged Coptic scheme.”67 As a result, on November 6, 1972, “a 
small [Coptic] church was burned [down] in a Delta village.”68 This 
act of violence resulted in a Coptic demonstration at the site of the 
burned church, which, in turn, “erupted into anti-Coptic street 
demonstrations.”69 During the anti-Coptic demonstration “an un-
known person, thought to be a Copt, fired shots into the air.”70 
This, according to the police, lead to further acts of violence by Mus-
lims who burned down Coptic homes and shops.71 In total, forty-
eight people died during these riots.72 After these incidents, a parlia-
mentary inquiry was undertaken in which the government ultimately 
accused “foreign agents of stirring up religious animosity.”73 As a re-
sult of this inquiry, no Egyptians were punished for instigating the 
violence. Sadat, to his credit or discredit, depending on one’s point 
of view, in a much publicized move, persuaded both the rector of Al-
Azhar University (a Muslim leader) and the Coptic Pope to “issue 
public pronouncements condemning the strife and its foreign insti-
gators.”74 
Despite calming some of the violence in the earlier years of the 
1970s, Islamists continued to gain considerable influence over Mus-
lims, particularly in universities.75 In 1977, there were also “wide-
spread clashes between Muslims and Copts in Upper Egypt.”76 That 
 
 66. Id. at 2. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. (“The police reports that an unknown or unknown persons tried to burn a 
chapel in the ‘Khanka’ village.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See An-Na’im, Religious Freedom, supra note 64, at 43.  
 73. FARAH, supra note 60, at 2. 
 74. Id.  
 75. See id. In fact, “[i]n 1974, a neo-Islamic group called Muhamed’s Youth attempted 
the takeover of the Military academy.” Id. 
 76. Id. 
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same year “a neo-Islamic group called Repentance and Holy Flight 
kidnapped” and murdered Sheikh Mohammed Dahbi, a famous Is-
lamic scholar who had attacked religious fanaticism and who had 
been the former Minister of Waqfs (religious endowments).77 All of 
these acts of violence were a sign that the Islamists were becoming 
stronger.78 Indeed, Islamists were becoming stronger throughout the 
entire Middle East and were pressuring governments to adopt a lit-
eral application of Islamic law, based on the shari´a. As one Muslim 
scholar explained, the shari´a’s minor role in Islamic countries was no 
longer tolerated by Islamic fundamentalists: 
Due to both internal factors and external influence, Shari´a princi-
ples had been replaced by European law governing commercial, 
criminal, and constitutional matters in almost all Muslim coun-
tries. . . . 
 Recently, many Muslims have challenged the gradual weakening 
of Shari´a as the basis for their formal legal systems. Most Muslim 
countries have experienced mounting demands for the immediate 
application of Shari´a as the sole, or at least primary, legal system of 
the land. . . . Governments of Muslim countries generally find it 
difficult to resist these demands out of fear of being condemned by 
their own populations as anti-Islamic.79 
Indeed, this is what was happening in Egypt in the late 1970s, and it 
was quite successful. 
In August of 1977, to appease the increasingly popular Islamists 
in Egypt, the Egyptian government submitted a draft law to the par-
liament (People’s Assembly) proposing the adoption of the Islamic 
penal code on the subject of apostasy.80 The Coptic Church, shocked 
by the proposal, declared a five day fast “for all Copts.”81 This reac-
tion and additional support from American, Canadian, and Austra-
lian Copts caused the government to withdraw its proposal.82 Never-
theless, tensions between Islamists and Copts continued to mount. 
In 1978, “a number of churches were burned and some priests were 
 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. at 3. 
 79. An-Na’im, Human Rights, supra note 39, at 20-21 (citations omitted). 
 80. See FARAH, supra note 60, at 3. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
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physically attacked” in the cities of Assuit and Minya.83 During the 
same period, the Abu-Zabadal Coptic church was burned in Cairo, 
and, a year later, the famous Kasrayat Al-Rihan church was burned in 
the heart of the Christian suburb of Old Cairo.84 Meanwhile, on 
March 26, 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was consum-
mated in Washington, D.C., and Sadat’s popularity with Western 
democracies soared.85 His actions, however, angered many Islamists 
and eventually led to his assassination. 
On January 6, 1980, “the eve of Coptic Christmas,” further 
tragedy was inflicted upon Copts in Egypt when “several bombs ex-
ploded in churches in Alexandria.”86 Two weeks later, Islamists “st-
aged a vitriolic attack on the Copts” at a large conference at Al-
Azhar University.87 Because of the increasing threats of violence, in 
March Pope Shenouda canceled all Easter celebrations and withdrew 
to a desert monastery with his bishops.88 
Five months after these attacks, on May 22, 1980, Islamists 
gained a significant political victory when the Egyptian Constitution 
was amended to (1) specify Islam as the official state religion,89 (2) 
establish “Islamic jurisprudence as the principal source of legisla-
tion,” and (3) reinstate the shari´a as “the main” source of Egyptian 
legislation.90 Nevertheless, these amendments failed to appease many 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER, SADAT AND AFTER: STRUGGLES FOR EGYPT’S 
POLITICAL SOUL 1 (1990). Baker observed: 
Anwar Sadat was the one Arab leader whom Americans thought they knew and un-
derstood. In American eyes, Sadat was the man who repudiated socialism and ex-
pelled the Soviets from Egypt; he made peace with Israel, liberalized the Egyptian 
polity, and returned Egypt to the Western fold. During Sadat’s years in power the 
United States involved itself deeply in Egyptian politics, underwriting everything 
from the 1979 peace with Israel to the official population control effort. The United 
States provided Egypt with over $17 billion, making it the second-largest recipient 
of U.S. aid in the world. Over the years the United States supplied every conceivable 
technical device, at a cost estimated at $20 to $25 million, to protect the life of the 
man on whom U.S. Middle East strategies depended. The president of Egypt was 
Time magazine’s man of the year, his wife the “first lady” of the Arab world. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 86. FARAH, supra note 60, at 3. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Even though Islam was specified as the state religion, this did not give Egypt the 
right to discriminate against the Copts. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 90. MADDEX, supra note 44, at 72.  
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Islamists who wanted “immediate and total implementation” of the 
shari´a.91 Naturally, these amendments were not well received by the 
Copts, either.92 The discontent of both the Islamists and the Copts 
with the amendments led to a massive revolt in the Cairo “district of 
Al-Zawya Al-Hamra on June 17, 1981.”93 In total, seventeen people 
were killed “([nine] Copts,94 [seven] Muslims and one unidentified), 
112 were injured and 171 public and private” buildings were dam-
aged over a three day period.95 In light of the serious fighting and 
strong contention between the two religions, Sadat ordered 1500 ar-
rests of both political and religious figures “from the extreme right 
to the left.”96 Sadat withdrew state recognition of Pope Shenouda III 
and banished him to a monastery in Upper Egypt.97 In addition, 
many Islamists were arrested and jailed.98 Just one month later, Sadat 
was assassinated by violent Islamists.99 
 
 
 
 91. An-Na’im, Religious Freedom, supra note 64, at 46. 
 92. See ANTHONY MCDERMOTT, EGYPT FROM NASSER TO MUBARAK: A FLAWED 
REVOLUTION 113 (1988). 
 93. FARAH, supra note 60, at 3. 
 94. This figure was questioned by a Le Monde correspondent, who reported “that ‘Cop-
tic infants were thrown from windows or burned alive with their parents.’” MCDERMOTT, su-
pra note 92, at 193. 
 95. See FARAH, supra note 60, at 4. 
 96. Id. at xi. 
 97. See id. at xi. In other words, Sadat annulled the 1971 election of the Pope. See 
WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1985, at A19, available in 1985 WL 2140431. 
 98. See FARAH, supra note 60, at xi. 
 99. See id at xi. On Sadat’s assassination, one author wrote: 
Americans responded with outrage and sorrow and anticipated an outpouring of 
mass grief in Egypt. Instead, Egyptians responded with disconcerting quiet to Sa-
dat’s assassination. When Sadat’s predecessor, Gamal Abdul Nasser, had died a dec-
ade earlier, crowds had poured into the streets to grieve at the death of a leader rou-
tinely denounced in the United States as either a fascist or a communist. In the days 
following Sadat’s assassination Egyptians went about celebrating a religious holiday 
as though nothing had happened. Foreign journalists reported that, if anything, the 
streets were unusually deserted. Interviews by American correspondents revealed 
that “many people in Cairo expressed less outrage over the assassination than over 
the week’s cancellation of movies, soccer games and regular television programming 
(including the popular series ‘Dallas’).” On the day of Sadat’s funeral, lines of po-
licemen “stood with arms locked as if to hold back a crowd. But there was no 
crowd.” 
BAKER, supra note 85, at 2 (footnotes omitted). 
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Sadat’s successor, President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak100 was 
primarily concerned with a possible revolution in Egypt, similar to 
that which occurred in Iran two years earlier.101 Fortunately, how-
ever, Mubarak was able to contain threats of revolution, in part by 
arresting some two thousand people.102 In addition, when Mubarak 
first came to power, he declared Egypt to be in a “state of emer-
gency.”103 This “state of emergency,” which remains in effect, gives 
the president power to “refer cases to State security courts, to ratify 
judgments and to pardon.”104 The “state of emergency” also allows 
the Egyptian government to detain suspected violent criminals for up 
to sixty days without a hearing.105 
The first task of Mubarak’s presidency was to deal with the 
Islamists who had assassinated Sadat and who were growing in both 
numbers and strength.106 Aside from arresting the two thousand 
mentioned above, over three hundred men (mostly students) were 
put on trial for Sadat’s assassination.107 Although five of the three 
hundred accused admitted that they took part in Sadat’s assassina-
tion, they claimed they were innocent because they had received a 
fatwa (legal ruling) from a mufti (a religious judge) that “it was legal 
to kill a ruler who had disobeyed the ordinances of God.”108 This 
claim is unnerving because it demonstrates how serious the Islamists 
 
 100. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 92, at 68. At “his first public appearance before the 
People’s Assembly after Sadat’s killing,” Mubarak was still bandaged from the attack. Id. It 
should also be noted that, at the beginning of his presidency, Mubarak asked that “Moham-
med” be removed from reports of his actions and pronouncements. See id.  
 101. See id. at 196. 
 102. See id. at 73, 196-97. Other reasons would be that, first, Sadat’s September arrests 
had incarcerated many Muslim militants; second, the militant Muslims who had assassinated 
Sadat wrongly assumed that Egypt would naturally break out into revolt. See id. 
 103. See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., 1260th Mtg., at ¶ 7-9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.23 (1993), reprinted in 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP., May 1994, at 269, 270 
[hereinafter U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.]. The primary concern for human rights under this “state 
of emergency” are for the Islamic militants arrested and detained for up to 60 days before 
“permitting a challenge to the legality of the detention before a court of law.” 15A HUMAN 
RIGHTS, THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, AND THE UNITED STATES 1410 (Igor I. Kavass & William 
M. Walker eds., 1992) [hereinafter HELSINKI ACCORDS]. Legal duration of detention without 
the “state of emergency” in effect is 48 hours. See id. Naturally, Copts are not immune to 
“state of emergency” arrests. 
 104. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 103, ¶ 9.  
 105. See 15A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1410. 
 106. See generally MCDERMOTT, supra note 92, at 73, at 196-97. 
 107. See id. at 198. 
 108. Id. 
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were about following their rigid interpretation of the shari´a.109 Sur-
prisingly, the trial and the execution of the five conspirators took 
place with very little disturbance or demonstration.110 
In the 1980s, Mubarak’s government exhibited “a combination 
of reconciliation with moderates and toughness with those threaten-
ing the country’s security.”111 Indeed, Mubarak had many religious 
leaders of Muslim groups, primarily the Islamists, released from 
prison, notably Omar Telmessani and Sheikh Kishk.112 As for the 
Copts, Mubarak has traditionally appointed two Copts as ministers 
to his cabinet113 and is authorized to appoint up to ten members of 
the Parliament,114 typically consisting of Copts and women. In addi-
tion, Mubarak rescinded Pope Shenouda’s exile (confinement to his 
monastery), and thus enabled Pope Shenouda to return to Cairo in 
1985 to celebrate Christmas with the Copts.115  
III. TAKING STRIDES TOWARD A RELIGIOUSLY PLURALISTIC 
SOCIETY: EGYPT’S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS’ STANDARDS 
Egypt’s relationship with the United Nations and Egypt’s at-
tempts to eradicate religious human rights discrimination in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century are key factors in understanding 
current human rights issues in modern-day Egypt. 
Traditionally, Egypt has had a positive association with the 
United Nations. This association, beginning in late 1945,116 reached 
 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. It appears that this policy worked quite well during the first four years of Muba-
rak’s presidency (1982-85). In fact, there were only an average of eight casualties per year, 
making these years the most peaceful years since the 1952 revolution. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 
The Changing Face of Egypt’s Islamic Activism, in EGYPT, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: TWELVE 
CRITICAL ESSAYS 69, 72 (1996) [hereinafter Ibrahim, The Changing Face]. 
 112. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 92, at 198. 
 113. Zina Hemady, Coptic Christians Living in Fear, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 15, 1993, 
at 5C, available in 1993 WL 4492538 (“Copts rarely are given influential posts in government 
and the judiciary, military or diplomatic corps. Two Copts traditionally serve in each Cabinet, 
but do not hold such major portfolios as foreign affairs or defense.”). 
 114. See MADDEX, supra note 44, at 74; 16A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 
1381-83. 
 115. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 92, at 198-99.  Violence against the Copts in the 
1990s and the Egyptian government’s reaction to it will be discussed further in Part IV.A. 
 116. See PEASLEE, supra note 45, at 717. 
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its pinnacle when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian Copt, was ap-
pointed as the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1992.117 
As a member of the United Nations, Egypt has committed itself to 
the obligations found in the International Bill of Human Rights 
(IBHR).118 The IBHR is “the most authoritative and comprehensive 
prescription of human rights obligations that governments undertake 
in joining the U.N.”119 The IBHR includes the following docu-
ments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”);120 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights;121 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“CCPR");122 and the Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.123 This Part focuses primarily on 
Egypt’s obligations under two of these instruments: the UDHR and 
the CCPR. This Part concludes that through the UDHR and CCPR 
Egypt has made a strong and binding commitment to protect the re-
ligious human rights of its citizens. 
A. Egypt and the UDHR 
In 1948, the same year that Egypt enacted its French-based legal 
code, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UDHR.124 
The UDHR attempted to solidify the guarantee of “human rights 
for all” found in the United Nations Charter.125 Articles 7 and 18 of 
the UDHR provide: 
 
 117. See Stanley Meisler, Globocop Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Cryptic Egyptian Who Heads 
the United Nations, Has Ambitious Plans for Keeping the Peace in a Changing World. But Is It 
Enough?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, at 34, available in 1992 WL 2844394 [hereinafter 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali]. 
 118. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: 
LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 14 (2d ed. 1996). 
 119. Id. at 8. 
 120. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 121. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
 122. G.A. Res. 2200A, (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter CCPR]. 
 123. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
 124. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 118, at 8. 
 125. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1945-1995, at 6 (1995). This guar-
antee of universal human rights was made in response to the Nazi atrocities and World War II. 
See id.  
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All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimi-
nation to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal pro-
tection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration 
and against any incitement to such discrimination.126 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in pub-
lic or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.127 
Egypt, the only African country belonging to the United Nations 
when the UDHR was adopted, took part in the drafting and discus-
sions accompanying the adoption of the UDHR.128 Despite this fact, 
it can be argued that Egypt is not legally bound by the language of 
the UDHR. The primary reason for this argument is that the United 
Nations General Assembly only adopted the UDHR as a resolution; 
it “is not a convention subject to the ratification and accession re-
quirements foreseen for treaties.”129 But the history following the 
adoption of the UDHR demonstrates that the UDHR possesses 
tremendous “legal weight” above that of normal United Nations 
resolutions.131 For example: 
The role of the Assembly in interpreting provisions of the UN 
Charter, references in other instruments and resolutions, statements 
made by the Secretary-General and by governments in international 
and national settings, the above-mentioned monitoring activities 
on the basis of the UDHR, and its influence on subsequent stan-
dard-setting activities are all part of this picture, especially when 
 
 126. UDHR, supra note 120, art. 7. 
 127. Id. art. 18. Articles 13, guaranteeing the “freedom of movement,” and Article 26, 
providing the “right to education,” are also important to this Comment and will be discussed 
in more detail below. See infra Part IV.B.  
 128. See Åshild Samnøy, The Origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF 
ACHIEVEMENT 3, 10 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide eds., 1999). Most third world 
countries have since joined the United Nations. 
 129. Asbjørn Eide & Gudmundur Alfredsson, Introduction, in THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT xxv, xxx 
(Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide eds., 1999) [hereinafter Eide & Alfredsson, Introduc-
tion]. Interestingly, representatives from Egypt supported the argument that a nonbinding 
declaration should be first adopted, and then, at a future time, a binding convention should 
take its place. See, Samnøy, supra note 128, at 10. 
 131. See Eide & Alfredsson, Introduction, supra note 130, at xxx. 
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these instances make use of the UDHR as law for the purpose of 
providing a legal framework.132 
This statement, and others like it, tend to show that the UDHR 
should be viewed as a kind of customary international human rights 
law.133 Consequently, this Comment will analyze Egypt’s obligation 
to protect the religious human rights of its Coptic citizens as such. 
In other words, Egypt will be viewed as if it had a “legal duty”134 
under the UDHR to protect the religious human rights of the 
Copts. 
B. Egypt and the CCPR 
In addition to being a member of the United Nations when the 
UDHR was adopted, Egypt is a party to the CCPR, put into force in 
1976.135 Unlike the UDHR, the CCPR is binding on all nations who 
are a party to it, and, therefore, it imposes binding obligations and 
affirmative duties on those state parties.136 As for the obligations im-
posed under the CCPR, Article 18 states that freedom of conscience, 
thought, and religion are guaranteed.137 In addition, Article 27 for-
bids states from denying religious minorities “the right, in commu-
nity with other group members, to enjoy their own culture, profess 
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”138 
The affirmative duties imposed upon states are found in Article 2: 
(2) Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other 
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
 
 132. Id. at xxx-xxxi. 
 133. See Henry J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT 28 (1996). 
 134. See id.  
 135. See Donna E. Arzt, The Treatment of Religious Dissidents Under Classical and 
Contemporary Islamic Law, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: 
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 387, 394, n.24 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 
1996). Arzt also notes that this Covenant was signed by 23 other Muslim countries. See id. Of 
these 23 Muslim countries, only seven (Egypt not included), have signed the Optional Pro-
tocol. See id. at n.131. 
 136. See Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obliga-
tions Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 156, 166 (1987) (stating that Article 2 of the CCPR requires state parties to enact domes-
tic legal measures guaranteeing the freedoms set forth in the CCPR). 
 137. See CCPR, supra note 122, art. 18. 
 138. Id. art. 27. 
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processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
(3)  Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective rem-
edy, notwithstanding that the violation has been commit-
ted by the persons acting in official capacity;  
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall 
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of 
the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial rem-
edy; 
(c)  To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce 
such remedies when granted.139 
Thus, the CCPR expects states to incorporate its principles into the 
states’ domestic laws.  
The CCPR, under Article 40, created the United Nations Hu-
man Rights Committee, also known as the CCPR Committee, to 
whom states are to submit reports “on measures taken to ‘give effect’ 
to the undertakings of the Covenant and on progress in the enjoy-
ment of rights declared by the Covenant.”140 In return, the CCPR 
Committee comments on the reports and gives to the reporting state 
general suggestions on how to improve human and religious rights 
among its populace.141 Article 28 of the CCPR requires that the 
committee be selected from “persons of high moral character and 
recognized competence in the field of human rights.”142 In 1994, 
Egypt was privileged to have one of its citizens elected to the com-
mittee.143 
 
 139. Id. art. 2(2)-(3) (emphasis added). 
 140. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 133, at 501; see also CCPR, supra note 122, art. 
40.  
 141. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 133, at 501. The effect these reports had on 
Egypt will be discussed later. See infra Part IV.B. 
 142. CCPR, supra note 122, art. 28. 
 143. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 118, at 91. 
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In summary, Egypt has enjoyed a commendable association with 
the United Nations Egypt was an active participant in the adoption 
of UDHR and is a state party to the CCPR. As a result of this asso-
ciation, Egypt has displayed a commitment to high standards of pro-
tecting religious freedoms among its citizens. 
IV. ANALYSIS: THE EXTENT OF EGYPT’S DUTY TO PROTECT THE 
COPTS FROM NONSTATE DISCRIMINATION. 
This Part analyzes the Egyptian government’s affirmative duty to 
protect Copts from nonstate religious discrimination and offers sug-
gestions as to how Egypt can better combat such discrimination. Ac-
cordingly, Part IV.A focuses on the Egyptian government’s affirma-
tive duty to protect Copts from violent attacks. Part IV.B argues that 
the first step Egypt must take in order to more completely fulfill this 
duty is to eliminate all forms of discrimination found in its own Con-
stitution, courts, and legislation. Finally, Part IV.C discusses how 
three different countries, through their constitutions, courts, and 
legislative laws, have tried to fulfill their affirmative duty to protect 
their religious minorities from nonstate discrimination. 
A. Egypt’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Religious Groups From 
Discrimination by Nonstate Actors 
The most radical form of discrimination against Coptic Egyptians 
is violence by nonstate actors.144 Part IV.A focuses on the Egyptian 
government’s affirmative duty to protect the Copts from these vio-
lent attacks. Specifically, Part IV.A.1 briefly describes the current 
state of violence in Egypt and the government’s response to these 
acts of violence. Part IV.A.2 responds to two issues: (1) whether the 
UDHR and the CCPR impose upon governments an affirmative 
duty to protect the religious human rights of their citizens; and (2) 
whether the UDHR and the CCPR impose upon governments a 
duty to control the discriminatory acts of nonstate actors. Part 
IV.A.2 also discusses the consequences of ignoring or treating lightly 
this affirmative duty. 
 
 144. Another form of discrimination is the forcible collection of the jizyah. See The Cry of 
the Egyptian Church, in THE COPTS: CHRISTIANS OF EGYPT, Jan.-June 1999, at 3 (“In spite of 
the abolition of the jizya, it is still forcibly collected from many Christians in Upper Egypt by 
Muslim extremists.”). 
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1. The current state of violence in Egypt and the government’s reaction 
The first four years of the 1990s were the bloodiest in twentieth-
century Egypt.145 During this time span, some 1164 people were 
killed in Egypt due to religiously and politically motivated vio-
lence.146 Admittedly, the Copts were not always the target of these 
violent rampages, but religious principles were.147 While it was hoped 
that this violence had come to a permanent end in the latter half of 
the 1990s,148 the bloodiest sectarian clash in Egypt’s modern history 
left twenty Copts and one Muslim dead on January 2, 2000, in the 
village of Al-Kosheh.149 
Though the perpetrators of these violent attacks against Copts 
have been Islamists,150 many complaints, some over-dramatized and 
 
 145. See Ibrahim, The Changing Face, supra note 111, at 72. 
 146. See id. Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (“EOHR”) has reported that ap-
proximately 109 Copts have been killed in the last decade (1990-2000). See Kosheh Investiga-
tions Begin, CAIRO TIMES, Jan. 13-19, 2000 (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http:// 
www.cairotimes.com/news/kosheh3.html>. 
 147. See Ibrahim, The Changing Face, supra note 111, at 73: 
[S]everal assassination attempts were made by Islamic activists on the lives of high-
ranking public figures. Two of them were successful—Rifa’t al-Mahgub, the former 
speaker of parliament (October 1990)[] and Farag Fouda, Egypt’s most outspoken 
secular intellectual (June 1992). The activists also managed to assassinate four police 
generals, including the top ranking anti-terrorist officer (General R. Khayrat on 9 
April 1994). There were attempts on the lives of two cabinet members (the minis-
ters of information and the interior, in April and August 1993, respectively) and on 
the prime minister (in November 1993). 
Id. 
 148. In March of 1999, an article in the Economist read: 
Although their movement had at one time seemed dangerously pervasive, Egypt’s 
Islamists never had a wide popular base. Under persecution, the air went out of 
them. Their (banned) political party, the Muslim Brotherhood, had long since 
grown fat and flabby; in the countryside, there was little public support for the radi-
cals; and the security force’s counter-measures were savagely effective. More than 
1,000 people—guerrillas, soldiers and civilians—were killed in the violence. Some 
100 activists were sentenced to death, mainly by military courts, and about half of 
these sentences have been carried out. The remaining guerrillas are in prison, in exile 
or on the run. 
  The last seven or eight years have been troublesome, but most Egyptians be-
lieve that the worst is over, for now. 
Is the War Against the Militants Won?: Islamists In Retreat, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1999, at 
15, available in 1999 WL 7362217. 
 149. See At Least 20 Killed in Kosheh Clashes, CAIRO TIMES, Jan. 13-19, 2000 (visited 
Jan. 21, 2000) <http://www.cairotimes.com/news/newkosh.html>. 
 150. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Governance and Structural Adjustment, in EGYPT, ISLAM 
AND DEMOCRACY 135, 169 (1996) [hereinafter Ibrahim, Governance and Structural Adjust-
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some not, have been directed against the Egyptian government for 
its failure to prevent and investigate the violence. For example, in 
1993, it was alleged, in a rather biased manner, that 
[n]ot a month goes by that a number [of Copts] aren’t murdered, 
tortured, or beaten for their faith. Mobs kill them; the government 
discriminates against them and deliberately withholds protec-
tion. . . . Those who slept through the Cold War will continue to 
slumber during the coming Holy War, unless a dynamite blast 
shakes them out of their lethargy.151 
A less dramatized complaint in 1993 listed Egypt among the “worst 
areas involving the suppression” of a religious group because “the 
government has failed to prevent harsh Muslim discrimination, often 
including violence, against Coptic Christians.”152 Finally, the Egyp-
tian Organization for Human Rights (“EOHR”), in a report issued 
in 1993, “accused Egyptian security forces of allowing Islamic ex-
tremists to commit acts of anti-Christian violence with their com-
plete knowledge, sometimes even when they had advance warn-
ings.”153 These same complaints were revisited after the Al-Kosheh 
violence in January of 2000, where the EOHR reported that Egyp-
tian security forces failed to implement any preventive plans between 
the initial confrontations between Copts and Muslims and the 
bloody massacre two days later.154 
2. A government’s affirmative duty to act under the UDHR and the 
CCPR 
If the violent attacks against the Copts were encouraged or per-
petrated by the Egyptian government, there would be a clear and se-
rious violation of Egypt’s obligations under the UDHR and 
CCPR.155 But, as the panel discussed in Part I pointed out, Egypt 
 
ment] (stating that the increased violation of human rights have been at the hand of “non-state 
actors—namely militant Islamic groups”). 
 151.  Don Feder, In Sheik Omar, Do We Behold Islam’s True Face?, B. HERALD, Aug. 30, 
1993, at 021, available in 1993 WL 6284485. 
 152. Stanley Meisler & Tyler Marshall, Hot Spots On Human Rights: A List of Offenders, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 14, 1993, available in 1993 WL 3368416 (referring to a list put 
out by the United Nations, private human rights monitors and new accounts). 
 153. Bob Hepburn, Egypt’s Christians Harbor Deep Fears, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 19, 
1993, available in 1993 WL 7251672. 
 154. See Kosheh Investigations Begin, supra note 146. 
 155. Indeed, between 1982 and 1993, over 25,000 Egyptians suspected of participating 
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has, at the very least, “not condoned” these acts.156 Thus, the argu-
ment seems to be that Egypt is not guilty of discriminating against 
the Copts, even if Egypt fails to react quickly to violent acts157 or fails 
to prevent foreseeable violent acts, as alleged above. In other words, 
it may be argued that while the Egyptian government itself is obli-
gated under the UDHR and the CCPR not to violate the religious 
human rights of the Copts, the government may not be obligated to 
prevent nonstate actors from violating the religious human rights of 
the Copts as long as they do “not condone” the violence. This ar-
gument raises two issues: (1) whether the UDHR and the CCPR 
impose upon governments an affirmative duty to protect the reli-
gious human rights of their citizens; and (2) whether the UDHR 
and the CCPR impose upon governments a duty to control the dis-
criminatory acts of nonstate actors.  
a. A government’s affirmative duty to protect the religious human 
rights of its citizens under the UDHR and CCPR. A government’s 
duty to act differs under the UDHR and the CCPR. The UDHR 
 
in politically-motivated violence were arrested and detained. See Ibrahim, The Changing Face, 
supra note 111, at 72-73. Moreover, in July of 1992 the parliament 
passed several antiterrorism amendments to the Penal Code. These amendments 
broadened the definition of terrorism to include “spreading panic” or obstructing 
the work of authorities. The amendments allow the police to hold suspects for 24 
hours before obtaining arrest warrants and prescribe the death penalty or life impris-
onment for membership in a terrorist group. 
17 HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 992. Some Copts would argue that the govern-
ment only took these affirmative measures to combat violence because of the toll it took on 
Egypt’s most profitable industry: tourism. For example: 
Many Copts feel bitter that President Hosni Mubarak’s government did not act de-
cisively against extremism until its economic interests were threatened. Police began 
to crack down after attacks on tourists last year reduced income from tourism by half 
within weeks. 
  “There’s a lot of discontent that the government didn’t take serious action to 
fight extremism,” said Antoun Sidhum, editor of the Coptic newspaper Watani. 
Hemedy, supra note 113. 
 156. See supra Part I. 
 157. A classic example of the government’s “slow reaction” is portrayed in a late 1980s 
takeover of Western Munira, a Cairo shantytown, by a group of Islamic militants who 
practically ruled it for three years—collecting taxes, imposing their own law and or-
der, and Islamic codes of morality. In December 1992, the Egyptian state finally 
took action, dispatching some twelve thousand security forces with armored vehicles 
to reclaim the area. It took three weeks, one hundred casualties (on both sides), and 
the arrest of some six hundred suspected militants before W[estern] Munira was 
pacified. 
Ibrahim, The Changing Face, supra note 111, at 75-76. 
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simply prohibits a government from engaging “in any activity or . . . 
perform[ing] any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein.”158 But, in general, the UDHR does 
not require “government machinery” to affirmatively protect reli-
gious human rights.159 Article 2(2) of the CCPR, however, requires 
that a state undertake “the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Cove-
nant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary 
to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”160 
Article 2(3) requires states to provide an “effective remedy” to those 
individuals whose religious human rights have been violated.161 Thus, 
states that are party to the CCPR, as Egypt is, are affirmatively obli-
gated to enact “legal measures” to protect the religious human rights 
of their citizens.162 
b. A government’s affirmative duty to control nonstate discrimina-
tion under the CCPR. Although Egypt has a duty to enact “legal 
measures” to ensure the protection of its citizens’ religious human 
rights under the CCPR, there is no explicit affirmative duty on a 
state party to the CCPR to control the discriminatory acts of non-
state actors. General Comments on the text of the CCPR, however, 
clarify that a state party to the CCPR does have an affirmative duty 
to protect its citizens’ religious human rights from the discriminatory 
acts of nonstate parties. For example, in the General Comments to 
Article 7 of the CCPR, the Human Rights Committee stated that, 
“it is also the duty of public authorities to ensure protection by the 
law against [discrimination] even when committed by persons acting 
outside or without any official authority.”163 Likewise, in a General 
 
 158. UDHR, supra note 120, art. 30. 
 159. After discussing the importance the UDHR plays in “customary international hu-
man rights law,” Boutros Boutros-Ghali admits: 
[T]he Universal Declaration does not have a direct impact on government machin-
ery. Its preamble deals for the most part with “peoples” and “individuals” and its in-
spiring message provides encouragement to the excluded and the persecuted in their 
daily struggles. Their cry for justice and freedom, amplified by human rights groups, 
resonates louder each day in the corridors of power. 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 28. 
 160. CCPR, supra note 122, art. 2(2). 
 161. See id. art. 2(3). 
 162. See Alston & Quinn, supra note 136, at 166. 
 163. Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Comments on Article 7 of the Cove-
nant, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 95, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982). 
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Comment on discrimination, the Committee receiving states’ reports 
requested “to know if there remain any problems of discrimination 
in fact, which may be practised [sic] either by public authorities, by 
the community, or by private persons or bodies. The Committee wishes 
to be informed about legal provisions and administrative measures 
directed at diminishing or eliminating such discrimination.”164 
Given the strength and clarity of these comments on the CCPR, 
Egypt arguably does have an affirmative duty to protect its citizens 
from the discriminatory actions of nonstate actors. And, because 
“[o]ne clear victim of the . . . violence in Egypt is human rights,”165 
this protection should include an alert and timely response to threats 
or beginnings of violence and an adequate and fair investigation of 
the violence after it has occurred. If the allegations are valid that the 
Egyptian government is slow to respond to threats of violence by 
nonstate actors against the Copts and fails to adequately investigate 
these acts of violence, then Egypt is violating its obligations under 
the CCPR. 
c. Consequences of ignoring or treating lightly the affirmative duty. 
Merely “not condoning” nonstate discrimination does not release 
the Egyptian government from its responsibility to protect the 
Copts’ religious human rights from this discrimination. Indeed, if 
the Egyptian government merely deplores the violence but does 
nothing to stop it, the government sends the message to Islamists 
that violence will not be punished. Even if the Egyptian government 
does more than “not condone” the violence but nonetheless reacts 
slowly or inadequately to it, the Islamists still have very little reason 
to refrain from violence. Thus, under these scenarios, the Copts must 
either suffer extreme forms of discrimination or stand up the to dis-
crimination themselves by confronting violence with violence. 
Clearly, such outcomes are not in the best interest of the Copts or 
the Egyptian government. Therefore, the government must do 
something more than simply “not condone” nonstate discrimination 
against Copts.  
 
 
 
 164. General Comment No. 18, “Non-discrimination” , U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 
4 Sept. 1992, at 25 (emphasis added). 
 165. Ibrahim, Governance and Structural Adjustment, supra note 150, at 169. 
BRO-FIN.DOC 10/31/00  4:54 PM 
1049] The Coptic Church in Egypt 
 1075 
B. A New Legal Reformation in Egypt 
This Part argues that the first step Egypt needs to take in order 
to more completely fulfill its affirmative duty to protect the Copts 
from nonstate discrimination is to substantially reform its legal sys-
tem. Indeed, under Articles 2(2)-(3) of the CCPR, Egypt is required 
to reform its laws in such a way that the religious human rights of all 
its citizens will be protected. Accordingly, Part IV.B.1 points out the 
insufficiency of solutions already proposed by the United Nations 
and the United States. Part IV.B.2 argues that for Egypt to enhance 
the protection of the Copts, Egypt must eliminate all forms of state-
sanctioned discrimination by reforming its own Constitution, courts, 
and legislation. Finally, Part IV.B.3 provides a summary of the issues 
presented and the changes suggested that could create an Egyptian 
society more tolerant of religious pluralism. 
1. Inadequate solutions proposed by the United Nations and the United 
States 
The natural way for Egypt to enhance its protection of Copts 
from nonstate discrimination and violence is to improve its response, 
make more thorough investigations, and strengthen the punishment 
of those perpetuating the violence. But this solution is too simplistic 
for two reasons. First, the Egyptian government already claims that it 
is doing all it can do to eliminate violent acts of discrimination.166 Af-
ter all, even if the government did not care about its effect on the 
Copts, they certainly do care about its drastic effect on their most 
prized industry: tourism.167 Second, assuming the government uses 
all of its effort to fight violence, this fight does nothing to combat 
the ideology behind the violence—that traditional Islam, with all of 
its discriminatory effects on non-Muslims, should be reinstated as the 
foundation of Egypt’s society and culture. Thus, the violence, no 
matter how fiercely combated, will continue to appear so long as the 
ideology exists. In other words, it is like pulling a weed out of the 
garden but leaving its roots in the ground to grow another day. 
Therefore, something more than quicker responses, better investiga-
 
 166. See, e.g., Kosheh Investigations Begin, supra note 146 (summarizing typical headlines 
to the effect that “[t]he government affirms that it will strike hard against any attempt to create 
division within the people”). 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
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tions, and swifter prosecutions must be undertaken. This Section will 
consider the solutions to this issue proposed by the United Nations 
and United States. 
a. The United Nations’ solution. The only suggestion given by the 
Human Rights Committee during Egypt’s more violent years was to 
withdraw Egypt’s state of emergency laws.168 As mentioned in Part II 
of this Comment, these laws give the Egyptian President the unilat-
eral power to involve himself in both the executive and judiciary 
branches of Egypt’s government.169 These laws also permit the Presi-
dent to “refer cases to State security courts, to ratify judgments and 
to pardon.”170 The most egregious portion of this law is its ability to 
incarcerate criminal suspects for up to sixty days before “permitting a 
challenge to the legality of the detention before a court of law.”171 
The Human Rights Committee, however, was not concerned 
with the religious human rights of the Copts in making this sugges-
tion. Instead, this suggestion was made in response to reports of 
Egyptian security forces unjustly detaining and torturing suspected 
nonstate Muslim perpetrators of violence.172 This suggestion is in-
adequate to solve the problem for several reasons. First, it does not 
take into account the Coptic situation. In fact, there is no evidence 
that the Human Rights Committee was at all concerned about the 
violent acts perpetrated against the Copts.173 Second, there is a 
strong argument that without the state of emergency powers in ef-
fect, the government’s response to, and investigation of, violence 
would be even slower and more inadequate. Finally, the Human 
Rights Committee’s suggestion is not responsive to the reasons un-
derlying Egypt’s current state of emergency and to the underlying 
cause of violence in Egypt. In other words, the United Nations’ so-
lution may improve the human rights of those persecuted under 
Egypt’s state of emergency laws, but it does nothing to combat the 
ideology that underlies the violence. Therefore, dissolving Egypt’s 
state of emergency is not only unresponsive to the problems of vio-
 
 168. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 103, ¶ 9. It should be noted that religious 
human rights are nonderogable during times of emergency. See CCPR, supra note 122, art. 4. 
 169. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 103, ¶ 9. 
 170. Id. ¶ 9. 
 171. 15A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1410. Legal duration of detention 
without the “state of emergency” in effect is 48 hours. See id.  
 172. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 103, ¶ 9. 
 173. See generally id. 
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lent acts committed against the Copts, it may even enhance the 
problem. 
b. The United States’ solution. Another solution to the problem of 
controlling violence against Copts in Egypt is found in the Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Act (“IRFA”), passed on October 9, 1998, 
by a vote of 98-0, in the United States Senate.174 Under the IRFA, 
Congress has the power to adjust United States foreign aid accord-
ing to how well a country is protecting the religious freedom of its 
inhabitants.175 Likewise, under the IRFA, Congress can impose eco-
nomic sanctions on countries for not responding to religious perse-
cution at the hands of nonstate actors.176 Because Egypt receives ap-
proximately two billion dollars a year from the United States in 
foreign aid, the IRFA has real implications for Egypt.177 In an effort 
to utilize the full strength of the IRFA, the American Coptic Asso-
ciation successfully lobbied the Senate appropriations subcommittee 
to propose that the entire two billion dollars in foreign aid “be con-
ditioned on improvements in ‘respect’ for Copts.”178 
The IRFA has not been well received by either Copts or Muslims 
living in Egypt. For example, while the IRFA was still being debated 
before the House, Egyptian Economy Minister, Youssef Boutros-
Ghali, a Copt and nephew to Boutros Boutros-Gahli, went to Wash-
ington to urge congressmen not to support the bill.179 One newspa-
per reported, “Boutros-Ghali stated that while he was not saying that 
Christians in Egypt were doing fine–‘they are not’–external pressures 
would be to no avail ‘and I will ally myself with the Moslem against 
Congress, which seeks to meddle [in Egypt’s internal affairs].’”180 
 
 174. Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401-81 (Supp. 
2000)) [hereinafter IRFA]; see also Aimee Howd, Pyramid Shadows Hide Persecution, INSIGHT 
MAG., Aug. 9, 1999, at 22, available in 1999 WL 8674124; Major Provisions of H.R. 2431 the 
International Religious Freedom Act, in THE COPTS: CHRISTIANS OF EGYPT, Jan.-June 1999. 
 175. See IRFA, supra note 174; see also Major Provisions of H.R. 2431 the International 
Religious Freedom Act, supra note 174. 
 176. See Timothy C. Morgan & Kees Hulsman, Church of the Martyrs: Copts Thrive in the 
Face of Bloody Carnage, Legal Restraints, and Discrimination, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 11, 
1997, at 6, available in 1997 WL 8863266. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. It should be noted that nothing, as of yet, has been done. But, the New York 
City Council has begun to consider a bar to granting municipal contracts with firms that do 
business “with countries that persecute Christians,” including Egypt. See id. at 6-7. 
 179. See Egyptian Coptic Minister in Washington to Lobby Against Religious Persecution 
Bill, MIDEAST MIRROR, Apr. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 27568379. 
 180. Id. 
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Furthermore,  
the reaction of Egyptian Copts to recent legislation in the United 
States, purportedly intended to protect religious minorities around 
the world from persecution, was anything but grateful. 
Everybody from Coptic Pope Shenouda III on down said they 
were shocked-shocked!–to learn that anyone would think there was 
religious discrimination in Egypt. And besides, the United States 
ought to keep its nose out of Egypt’s business.181 
While it is doubtful that the once outspoken Pope Shenouda III was 
shocked to think that anyone would believe there is religious dis-
crimination in Egypt, there is good reason for the Egyptian Copts to 
resist the U.S. government’s cutting off of aid to Egypt on their be-
half. The reason is that Egypt’s economy is very fragile, and violent 
acts within Egypt have been shown to correlate with Egypt’s econ-
omy.182 In other words, encouraging Egypt to speed up its response 
to religious discrimination against Copts by cutting off their eco-
nomic lifeline may only increase the probability of violent acts 
committed against Copts. Thus, cutting off economic aid to the 
Egyptian government is not an effective means of protecting Copts 
from violent attacks at the hands of nonstate actors. Even if the 
IRFA were successful in compelling a quicker response by the 
Egyptian government, it would not address the underlying cause of 
nonstate discrimination in Egypt. Thus, under the very best of 
circumstances, the IRFA will only pick the weed but leave the root in  
 181. James J. Napoli, Egypt’s Coptic Christians, While Struggling to Maintain Their Heri-
tage, Decry U.S. Anti-Persecution Act, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF., Aug. 31, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 27643841. 
 182. See Ibrahim, The Changing Face, supra note 111, at 76. Ibrahim concludes: 
[I]t seems clear to us that the swift rise and spread of Islamic activism, with all its 
violent and non-violent strands, is associated with real or perceived crises—social, 
economic, political, cultural, regional, and international. The social crisis has to do 
with worsening equity, rising unemployment, structural misery, and the spreading 
sense of relative deprivation. The economic crises has to do with Egypt’s narrow re-
source base, rapidly growing population, external debt, and inadequate invest-
ments—factors which have depressed the real rate of economic growth to an annual 
average of 2 percent in the last decade. 
Id. Others argue that the real problem of violence originates with other Muslim countries. For 
example, “[e]ven today, some Middle east Christians argue that if it was not for the glut of oil 
money, the Islamist movement would wither. ‘If they stopped the funds coming from Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, all these problems would end,’ declared Father Ibrahim, a priest at the 
Ghamra Church in Cairo.” John Daniszewski, Christians as Underdogs Called Foreigners by 
Arabs, They Pre-Date Them, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 1997, at 5, available in 
1997 WL 11839576. 
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IRFA will only pick the weed but leave the root in the ground. Un-
der the very worst of circumstances, the IRFA not only leaves the 
weed in the ground but depresses Egypt’s economy even further and 
thereby causes the weed to grow uncontrollably. 
In summary, the answer to curbing violence carried out against 
the Copts in Egypt is very complex. Simply withdrawing Egypt’s “s-
tate of emergency” now in force will not combat the violent acts of 
nonstate actors because such an action will only slow down govern-
ment reaction and reduce its power to convict the criminals. In addi-
tion, this solution does not respond to the underlying causes of vio-
lence in Egypt. Likewise, while the United States’ solution of 
threatening to cut off economic aid may force the government to 
speed up its response to the violence, such an action will depress the 
Egyptian economy and thereby contribute to the violence. Like the 
United Nations, the United States has done nothing to address the 
underlying causes of violence. This Comment argues that, to be ef-
fective, prevention of nonstate discrimination in Egypt must first be 
dealt with by Egypt’s Constitution, courts, and legislation.  
2. Eliminating all forms of discrimination sanctioned by Egypt through 
reforming its Constitution, courts, and legislation  
A more plausible solution to nonstate discrimination against the 
Copts in Egypt would be for the Egyptian government, of its own 
free will, to eradicate all forms of religious discrimination in its own 
laws and thereby create a society more willing to accept religious plu-
ralism. For example, as Egypt currently stands, it does not seem to 
be “condoning” nonstate discrimination against the Copts but 
permitting less visible forms of discrimination in its Constitution, 
courts, and legislation. Not only is this “double-standard” a violation 
of Egypt’s obligation to conform its law to religious human rights 
protection under Article 2(2)-(3) of the CCPR,183 but it also sends 
the wrong message to nonstate discriminators: that Egypt is willing 
to tolerate discrimination based on religion. Accordingly, Part 
IV.B.2.a discusses areas of Egypt’s Constitution that need to be re-
formed. Part IV.B.2.b compliments Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional 
Court for its diligent efforts to reconcile the shari´a and democracy 
but offers suggestions on how Egypt’s entire court structure may be 
 
 183. For Article 2(2)-(3), see note 139 and accompanying text. 
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reformed to enhance religious human rights protection. Finally, Part 
IV.B.2.c analyzes specific laws that may be contributing towards 
Egypt’s double standard of “not condoning” nonstate discrimination 
but permitting discrimination in its own laws. 
a. Reformation of Egypt’s Constitution. As stated above in Part 
II.D, in 1980, Egypt’s Constitution was amended to: (1) specify Is-
lam as the official state religion,184 (2) establish “Islamic jurispru-
dence as the principal source of legislation,” and (3) reinstate the 
shari´a as “the main” source of Egyptian legislation.185 These 
amendments to Egypt’s Constitution, in and of themselves, do not 
violate the Copts’ religious human rights.186 “Nevertheless, interna-
tional law does not allow states to invoke religious law, or indeed any 
domestic law, as an excuse for breaching their treaty obligations.”187 
In addition, as the Human Rights Committee emphasized,  
the fact that a religion is recognized as an official or state religion 
or that its followers constitute the majority of a state’s population, 
is not a lawful ground for impairing any rights under the [CCPR], 
including rights under articles 18 and 27, of anyone who does not 
accept the official ideology or even outright opposes it.188  
In other words, the manner and extent to which the shari´a has been 
implemented to deprive the Copts of their religious human rights 
determines whether its inclusion in the Egyptian Constitution is a 
violation of Egypt’s obligation under the UDHR and CCPR. 
A total and complete implementation of the shari´a into Egypt’s 
legal system would clearly violate the Copts’ religious human 
rights.189 For example, the shari´a does not treat a non-Muslim living 
 
 184. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 185. MADDEX, supra note 44, at 72. 
 186. See Arzt, supra note 135, at 424 (“[I]nternational law does not require the separa-
tion of church and state, so Muslim governments are not absolutely precluded from enacting 
Shari´a within the formal structure of their domestic legal systems.”). However, in response to 
the 1980 shari´a amendment to the Egyptian constitution, one scholar argued: “[t]he change 
from ‘a main’ to ‘the main’ was clearly intended to emphasize the role of Shari´a, thereby giv-
ing constitutional support to demands for immediate and total implementation of Shari´a. . . . 
[T]his is detrimental to the cause of religious freedom and tolerance.” An-Na’im, Religious 
Freedom, supra note 64, at 46. 
 187. Arzt, supra note 135, at 425. 
 188. Id. at 394 n.25 (citing General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee under Article 40, ¶ 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/21/Rev.1/Add.4, Sept. 27, 1993, 4). 
 189. See An-Na’im, Human Rights, supra note 39, at 22. 
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in an Islamic state as a full citizen of that state.190 Admittedly, non-
Muslims are guaranteed protection of their person and property and 
a degree of autonomy “to practice their own religion,”191 but these 
limited rights are based upon the contingency that the dhimmis pay 
the jizyah, discussed above.192 In addition, the lives of dhimmis 
are evaluated as inferior in monetary terms as well: they are not en-
titled to the same amount of diya or financial compensation for 
homicide or bodily harm as Muslims. The reputation of a dhimmi 
is not protected by the Shari´a on equal terms with that of a Mus-
lim since the hadd of qadhf, the special criminal penalty for an un-
proven accusation of fornication, does not apply unless the victim is 
a Muslim. In the private law of Shari´a, discrimination against non-
Muslims includes the rule that a Muslim man may marry a 
dhimmi woman but a dhimmi man may not marry a Muslim 
woman.193 
Thus, substantial portions of the shari´a do not protect the funda-
mental religious human rights of non-Muslims living under its juris-
diction. 
Fortunately, Egypt has not yet implemented the more discrimi-
natory effects of the shari´a into its law and society. Indeed, Article 
46 of Egypt’s Constitution “provides that the state guarantees the 
freedom of religion and the freedom of practicing religious rites.”194 
Nevertheless, there are strong indications that the 1980 amendments 
to Egypt’s Constitution are moving Egypt further and further into a 
society less tolerant of religious pluralism. For example, as men-
tioned in Part II of this Comment, to minimize any resistance from 
the Copts after the enactment of the amendment, President Sadat 
blamed the necessary constitutional amendment on Pope Shenouda 
and his alleged efforts to initiate and intensify religious strife occur-
ring in Egypt.195 As a consequence of this amendment, on June 17, 
1981, a massive revolt occurred in Cairo.196 After three days of tur-
 
 190. See id. at 24. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 194. Awad Mohammed El-Morr, Judicial Sources for Supporting the Protection of Human 
Rights, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5, 17 
(Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997) [hereinafter El-Morr, Judicial Sources]. 
 195. See FARAH, supra note 60, at 3. 
 196. See id. 
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moil, seventeen people had died “([nine] Copts,197 [seven] Muslims 
and one unidentified), 112 were injured and 171 public and private” 
buildings were damaged, as noted.198 In light of the serious fighting 
and strong contention between the two religions, Sadat ordered 
1500 arrests of both political and religious figures “from the extreme 
right to the left.”199 Moreover, Sadat withdrew state recognition of 
Pope Shenouda III and banished him to a monastery in Upper 
Egypt.200 Under Article 2(3) of the CCPR, quoted above, Egyptian 
laws should have provided the Pope and his followers with an “effec-
tive remedy” for this violation of their “rights and freedoms.” Unfor-
tunately, none was provided, and the Coptic Pope consequently re-
mained in exile for over four years.201 
There are other, equally vivid indications that the 1980 amend-
ments are moving Egypt towards a society less tolerant of religious 
human rights. In 1981, the “Islamic Council,” consisting of repre-
sentatives from Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, prepared the Uni-
versal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (“UIDHR”).202 At first 
glance, the UIDHR appears to mirror the UDHR, but this is mis-
leading.203 For example, the UIDHR “does not guarantee equal 
treatment for religious minorities or state that discrimination based 
on religion is impermissible.”204 In addition, while Article 10 does 
state that there “shall be no compulsion in religion,” it cites as au-
thority the Qur’an 2:256, which is traditionally interpreted to mean 
“that dhimmis should not be forced to convert to Islam,” not that 
dhimmis will be treated on an equal basis with Muslims.205 
 
 197. This figure was questioned by a Le Monde correspondent, who reported that “Cop-
tic infants were thrown from windows or burned alive with their parents.” MCDERMOTT, su-
pra note 92, at 193. 
 198. FARAH, supra note 60, at 4. 
 199. Id. at xi. 
 200. See id. at xi. In other words, Sadat annulled the 1971 election of the Pope. See 
David B. Ottoaway, Egypt Frees Coptic Pope, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1985, available in 1985 WL 
2140431. 
 201. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 92, at 198-99. 
 202. See ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND 
POLITICS 22 (2d ed. 1995). The UIHDR is also referred to as the Muslim Declaration on 
Human Rights. A reprinted English version is found in Muhammad Tal’at Al-Ghunaimi, Jus-
tice and Human Rights in Islam, in JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 1, 14-22 
(Gerald E. Lampe ed., 1997). 
 203. See MAYER, supra note 202, at 22. 
 204. See id. at 131. 
 205. See id. 
BRO-FIN.DOC 10/31/00  4:54 PM 
1049] The Coptic Church in Egypt 
 1083 
In 1985, the Egyptian Parliament voted for a “gradual[] and 
scientific[]” implementation of the shari´a into Egyptian society and 
to revise aspects of the law inconsistent with the shari´a.206 Five years 
later, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (to which Egypt 
belongs) adopted the Cairo Declaration, which embodies a “general 
consensus—although only at the governmental level—on how Islam 
should affect rights.”207 The Cairo Declaration stands in clear defi-
ance to the UDHR and CCPR. For example, the last article of the 
Cairo Declaration announces that it is based only on the shari´a but 
that the Declaration applies to “every human being.”208 Thus, by ap-
plying the Declaration to every human being, the shari´a and its 
manifested problems for non-Muslims are also applied to every hu-
man being, regardless of religious affiliation. In addition, the Cairo 
Declaration contains no provision for equality of rights for non-
Muslims, excludes non-Muslims from the right to serve in public of-
fice, and forbids non-Muslims from marrying Muslims.209 
Finally, the Human Rights Committee has recently questioned 
the propriety of basing a country’s legal system on Islamic criteria: 
“the developments that had occurred in the world since the emer-
 
 206. See An-Na’im, Religious Freedom, supra note 64, at 46. In May of that same year, 
the pro-Islamic parliament abolished 
the 1979 women’s rights law on the grounds of its being unconstitutional. This law, 
known as ‘Jihan’s law’ because it was championed by Sadat’s wife (and issued by 
presidential decree and without the consent of parliament) declared that polygamy 
was legally harmful to a first wife and automatically gave her the right to divorce her 
husband. Moreover, it gave the wife the right to custody of young children and to 
the family dwelling after the divorce. Until that time, a husband could divorce his 
wife by saying simply ‘I divorce you’ three times. 
MCDERMOTT, supra note 92, at 200. Although this explanation is very simplistic and skims 
the surface, one reason for the abolition of women’s rights and the strong movement to im-
plement the shari´a immediately into Egypt’s legislative system is that the Muslim Brotherhood 
was exerting an ever stronger presence in Parliament. See id. at 93. Although, under the Con-
stitution, they were not allowed to form a political party, they were able to forge pacts with 
various political groups that would pursue their political agenda. See id. at 92-93. In short, 
“[s]ince Egypt’s national elections in 1984, Moslem Brotherhood’s leaders, many of whom 
have spent years in prison, have taken up moderate policies, saying they have renounced vio-
lence and decided to work within the system.” Stephen Franklin, Arab World Wary of Surging 
Islamic Fervor, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 1990, at 1, available in 1990 WL 2839806. These politi-
cal actions led to a greater rift between the Islamic fundamentalists and militants because the 
militants viewed the fundamentalist’s willingness to “operate within the system” as compromis-
ing true Islamic values. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 92, at 93. 
 207. MAYER, supra note 202, at 24. 
 208. See Arzt, supra note 135, at 396. 
 209. See MAYER, supra note 202, at 138. 
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gence of Islam [make] it permissible to ask whether the fact of order-
ing the whole life of a country on the basis of such ancient precepts 
could not give rise to certain problems.”210 As demonstrated by the 
Coptic Pope’s exile and the legislation discussed below, “certain 
problems” have already arisen in Egypt. 
In summary, Egypt has not implemented the more extreme 
forms of religious discrimination found in the shari´a. Nevertheless, 
there are strong indications that the 1980 amendments to Egypt’s 
Constitution are moving Egypt further and further into a society less 
tolerant of religious pluralism. In addition, by leaving the 1980 
amendments in Egypt’s Constitution without providing an “effective 
remedy” as provided by Article 2(3)(b) of the CCPR, Egypt has not 
fulfilled it obligation under the CCPR to undertake “the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes” to protect the 
religious human rights of the Copts. Furthermore, even if the Egyp-
tian government does not “intend” to use the shari´a to deprive 
Copts of religious human rights, allowing the shari´a to remain “the 
main” source of Egyptian law gives the wrong message to nonstate 
actors who do “intend” to utilize the shari´a to the detriment of 
Copts. On the basis of these possibilities, one scholar argued: “abol-
ish dhimma and all discrimination against non-Muslims under 
Shari´a. Unless these are abolished, there is no prospect for religious 
freedom in Egypt or anywhere else in the Muslim world which pur-
ports to apply any part of Shari´a.”211 While the abolition of the 
shari´a may be the best solution, Egypt’s Constitution should at least 
be reformed to clarify that principles of religious human rights trump 
the legal principles of the shari´a and that “effective remedies” will 
be provided when religious human rights are violated. 
b. Reformation of Egypt’s courts. Established in 1979,212 Egypt’s 
Supreme Constitutional Court “is an independent judicial body that 
exclusively applies judicial review of the constitutionality of laws and 
regulations, and also interprets the legislative texts, as prescribed by 
 
 210. Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of the 1194th Meeting, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR.1194 (1993), at 2, reprinted in FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBODT, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 139 (2d. ed. 1996). 
 211. An-Na’im, Religious Freedom, supra note 64, at 59. 
 212. Abd-El-Rahman Nosseir, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt and the Protec-
tion of Human Rights, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 47 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997). 
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law.”213 Accordingly, the Constitutional Court has tried to strike a 
balance between “normative Islamic principles” and Egypt’s “de-
mocratic character.”214 In addition, the Constitutional Court has ad-
vocated the need for Egypt to honor its obligations to international 
human rights instruments.215 In these endeavors, the Constitutional 
Court has been quite successful. For example, in 1996, the Constitu-
tional Court liberally interpreted Article 46 of Egypt’s Constitution 
on the “freedom of religion.” The court stated that 
this freedom principally and plainly means that no one may be 
compelled to believe in a religion which he denies; to declare the 
religion to which he adheres; to withdraw from the one he has cho-
sen; or to favour a particular religion in prejudice of another, either 
by way of contempt, defamation or renunciation. In other words, 
all religions are to be mutually tolerated and reciprocally re-
spected.216 
Because of this decision and others217 Egypt’s Constitutional Court 
has drawn “wide admiration” in many countries.218 
One of the reasons Egypt’s Constitutional Court has been suc-
cessful in protecting the human rights of Egyptian citizens is because 
of its refusal to apply Article 2 of the Constitution (the 1980 shari´a 
amendment) to any legislation that was enacted before the article 
was adopted in May 1980.219 Likewise, the Constitutional Court has 
“adopted a cautious attitude” toward applying Article 2 to any legis-
 
 213. Hatem Aly Labib Gabr, Recent Judgments of the Supreme Constitutional Court of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt Upholding Human Rights, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 61(Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997) [here-
inafter Gabr, Recent Judgments]. 
 214. Baber Johansen, Supra-Legislative Norms and Constitutional Courts: The Case of 
France and Egypt, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
347, 372 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997) [hereinafter Johansen, Supra-
Legislative Norms]. 
 215. Adel Omar Sherif, Unshakable Tendency in the Protection of Human Rights: Adher-
ence to International Instruments on Human Rights By the Supreme Constitutional Court of 
Egypt, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 35, 35 
(Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997) [hereinafter Sherif, Unshakable Tendency]. 
 216. El-Morr, Judicial Sources, supra note 194, at 17-18. 
 217. See, e.g., Sherif, Unshakeable Tendency, supra note 215, at 37-45 (summarizing cases 
on army discipline, nature preserves, mandatory arbitration, right to marry, right to employ-
ment for disableds, and students’ medical insurance). 
 218. See Gabr, Recent Judgments, supra note 213, at 61. 
 219. See Johansen, Supra-Legislative Norms, supra note 214, at 372. 
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lation adopted after May 1980.220 For example, in Case No. 29 of 
the eleventh judicial year, the Court held legislative acts that “may 
not contradict Islamic Shari´a principles” are only those acts “that 
are definitive in certainty as to the source from which they derive and 
as to their meaning.”221 In other words, acts that are not of certainty 
derived from the shari´a are subject to “discretionary interpretation” 
and do not have to be in complete conformity with the shari´a. 
Despite the Constitutional Court’s impressive rulings on human 
rights and reluctance to apply Article 2 to legislation enacted after 
May 1980, there is still need for reform in Egypt’s court system. 
First, Egyptian courts should not have to strike a balance between 
“normative Islamic principles” and Egypt’s “democratic character” if 
religious human rights are at stake. Under the UDHR and CCPR 
these rights cannot be compromised. Second, other high courts in 
Egypt have not followed the impressive precedent set by the Consti-
tutional Court in balancing Islamic principles and Egypt’s democ-
racy. For example, in 1995 and 1996, two of Egypt’s highest courts 
gave “precedence to the protection of religious legal doctrine devel-
oped more than 1,000 years ago over the constitutional guarantees 
of religious freedom and freedom of research.”222 On these decisions, 
one scholar observed: 
Instead of attempting to strike a balance between [Islam and de-
mocracy], they have opted for a hierarchical understanding of their 
relationship. . . . It seems to me that the option for a hierarchical 
understanding between religious values and democratic freedoms 
may have serious repercussions on the understanding of the free-
doms of religious practice, the freedom to profess a faith and the 
freedom of research. These freedoms are as vulnerable as religious 
texts and norms, and much as religious texts and norms they can-
not be made congruent with each and every interpretation.223 
In other words, some of Egypt’s highest courts compromise impor-
tant aspects of religious freedom by promoting what are seen to be 
discriminatory traditions of Islam. Thus, Egypt’s courts need to be 
reformed in such a way that when there is a conflict between tradi-
 
 220. See id. 
 221. Case No. 29 of the Eleventh Judicial Year, Mar. 26, 1994, reprinted in 1 YEARBOOK 
OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 128 (Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 1995). 
 222. Johansen, Supra-Legislative Norms, supra note 214, at 373. For more information 
on these cases, see id., at n.72. 
 223. See id. at 373. 
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tional notions of Islam and religious human rights, religious human 
rights will take precedence. This system of precedence is currently in 
effect in Lebanon and is discussed below in Part IV.C. 
c. Reformation of discriminatory laws. The 1980 shari´a amend-
ment’s implementation into Egyptian law and society has, at the very 
least, brought into question Egypt’s commitment to honor its obli-
gations under the UDHR and CCPR. Some Copts and international 
human rights organizations have additionally accused the Egyptian 
Parliament of depriving the Copts of religious human rights in pre-
sent-day Egypt through legislative means not necessarily related to 
the 1980 shari´a amendment.224 This subpart analyzes those accusa-
tions and suggests reformation in the following areas of legislative 
law: (1) building permits, (2) public education, (3) government rep-
resentation, (4) conversion from Islam to Christianity, and (5) press 
laws. 
 (1) Building permits. Article 21 of the CCPR states: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those im-
posed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a de-
mocratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or mor-
als or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.225 
Despite Egypt’s commitment to these principles, it is claimed that 
“[t]he most blatant discrimination against Copts is a law requiring 
presidential approval for the construction or repair of a church. It 
dates back to 1856 and is the only legal vestige of Ottoman Turk 
rule.”226 This law, sometimes called the Hamayouni Decree because 
of its historical origin, has made it extremely difficult for Copts to 
get a permit to renovate or build a new place of worship.227 Origi-
nally, this law, which is inapplicable to Muslims, required the Coptic 
Church to obtain “a series of permits culminating in a presidential 
decree” before it could start building or renovating.228 In 1998, 
 
 224. See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes. 
 225. CCPR, supra note 122, art. 21. 
 226. Zina Hemady, Copts Target of Muslim Radicals: Egyptian Christians Fear Govern-
ment Favors Islamic Fundamentalists, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 28, 1993, at 
A36, available in 1993 WL 7649210. 
 227. See 15A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1417. 
228. See id. For example,  
one Coptic Father complained that under this law he was prohibited from fixing a 
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however, President Mubarak amended the law so that governors too 
can authorize the issuance of a building permit.229 This procedural 
change to the law increased the issuance of permits from twenty 
building permits in 1997230 to 207 in 1998.231 But despite these im-
provements to the Hamayouni Decree, one Coptic Bishop pointed 
out: 
The procedure has changed, but not the regulations. The governor 
signs in stead of the president, but we still need permission to re-
pair even a toilet. As far as we can see, the security forces are still 
taking the final decisions. It’s a problem that the various stipula-
tions are still not clear enough. One of these, to give you an exam-
ple, is that we are not allowed to build in the vicinty of a mosque. 
But who knows what is considered to be ‘the vicinity’ of a mosque? 
How many metres is this? It would be a great improvement if crite-
ria like these would have been clarified.232 
Thus, there are still obvious problem areas in Egypt’s law on build-
ing permits. 
To be sure, there are valid reasons behind the use of the Hamay-
ouni Decree in Egypt. For example, building a Christian church in a 
Muslim neighborhood could lead to serious civil disruptions. In ad-
dition, the government should have a right to regulate buildings, in-
cluding how, where, and for whom they are built. Nevertheless, the 
language in Article 21 of the CCPR, quoted above, expressly grants 
the right to “peaceful assembly” with certain exceptions. In addition, 
none of these exceptions are applicable in the case of Egypt. For ex-
ample, imposing a 150-year-old building law only on the Copts in 
Egypt is “not necessary” for Egypt to maintain a democratic society. 
Furthermore, limiting the rights of Copts to worship in churches in 
 
leaky roof and sewage problems in his church. He had originally applied for a permit 
to fix them, but after facing one obstacle after another, he “secretly brought in a 
Christian plumber” to do the job. The repair work without the permit, which was 
still incomplete, was discovered and the Father was threatened “with a lengthy 
prison sentence,” but “got off with a fine almost equal to the amount in the build-
ing fund. The completed work had to be undone, including demolishing the new 
toilets. Water still pours down the walls from the roof, and the toilets are stopped 
up.” 
Egypt: Do Toilets have a Religion?, in THE COPTS: CHRISTIANS OF EGYPT, July, 1994, at 17. 
 229. See Hamayouni Legislation Obstructs Church Reconstruction, IDB, Apr. 1998, at 7. 
 230. See 18 HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1172.  
 231. See 23A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1653. 
 232. Hamayouni Legislation Obstructs Church Reconstruction, supra note 229, at 7. 
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need of renovation does not protect “public health or morals.” Fi-
nally, although there may be “security or public safety” concerns, it 
is still a violation of the Copts’ religious human rights to require 
them to comply with this ancient law without requiring the same of 
their Muslim counterparts. Thus, it appears that instead of amending 
the law to make it less restrictive, as President Mubarak has done, the 
law ought to be abolished altogether or made applicable to all reli-
gious groups. 
 (2) Public education. The role of the shari´a and Islamic values 
in public education have become an increasingly sensitive topic in 
Egypt. For example, in 1996, the Supreme Constitutional Court of 
Egypt affirmed a 1994 appellate court’s decision that the Minister of 
Education should prohibit female pupils in school from covering 
their faces.233 The court held that the shari´a did not specifically state 
that a woman’s entire face must be covered, except the eyes, and the 
shari´a was subject to several interpretations, and thus the Minister 
of Education had discretion to implement it as he did.234 In so hold-
ing, the Court advocated the “middle course” by refusing to impose 
an excessive dress code but upholding a very modest one.235 Al-
though none of the parties to this suit were Copts, it is clear that 
while the Court refused to impose an excessive dress code on all 
Egyptian school girls, Copts are subjected to the dress code issued by 
the Minister of Education as he implements the shari´a. Hence, the 
Minister of Education’s ability to impose the shari´a on Coptic chil-
dren in public schools violates Article 18(2) of the CCPR: “No one 
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have 
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”236 Thus, although the 
Constitutional Court softened the impact of the shari´a, the court’s 
decision still violated the CCPR by reinforcing the shari´a’s applica-
tion to all Egyptians regardless of religious preference. 
In related aspects of public education, Coptic children in public 
schools are required to memorize parts of the Qur’an in their Arabic 
studies class but are deprived of lessons on the subject of Christianity 
 
 233. See Case No. 8 of the 17th judicial year, judgment dated May 18, 1996, reprinted in 
3 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 178-80 (Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mal-
lat eds., 1996). 
 234. See id. at 180. 
 235. See id.  
 236. CCPR, supra note 122, art. 18(2). 
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in Egypt.237 In the universities, Copts were also denied admission to 
medical schools because “some Islamists find [] treatment of Muslim 
women by Coptic doctors [] offensive.”238 Furthermore, a law passed 
in 1972 gives the government authority to appoint university presi-
dents and deans of departments.239 This law, initially passed to thwart 
attempts of Islamic fundamentalists from taking over universities, has 
more recently been the means of depriving many qualified Coptic 
professors from these important positions.240 
Because these acts give preference to Muslims, they violate Arti-
cle 26 of the CCPR: “the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against dis-
crimination on any ground such as . . . religion.”241 More impor-
tantly, however, discrimination in public education teaches those 
students in education that it is acceptable to treat individuals differ-
ently because of their religion. 
State authorized discrimination sends the wrong message to 
those nonstate actors who prefer to discriminate against Copts in 
more extreme manners. Just as importantly, any discrimination in 
public education teaches future leaders of Egypt that religious dis-
crimination is acceptable. 
 (3) Government Representation. Article 25 of the CCPR 
states: 
Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity, without any of 
the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable 
restrictions: 
(a)  To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives; 
(b)  To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections. . . . 
 
 
 237. See 17 HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 997-98. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See Ibrahim, Governance and Structural Adjustment, supra note 150, at 167 (citing 
Law No. 49/1972). 
 240. See Charles M. Sennott, A Struggle Against Intolerance, B. GLOBE, Jan. 18, 1999, 
at A1, available in 1999 WL 6043846 (“None of the presidents or deans at Egypt’s universi-
ties is a Copt.”). 
 241. CCPR, supra note 122, art. 26. 
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(c)  To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service 
in his country.242 
Egypt’s commitment to this article is questionable. For example, 
Egypt’s Constitution forbids sectarian groups from forming political 
parties.243 Additionally, even if the Copts could form themselves into 
a nonreligious political party, they would have to garner eight per-
cent of the total vote before a member of their party could have a 
seat in Parliament.244 Hence, it is not surprising that in 1995 “[f]ifty-
six Copts ran in the election, but all lost.”245 In addition to low or no 
representation in elected positions, there are complaints that Copts 
are rarely appointed heads of public or government institutions.246 A 
classic example of discrimination in this area is Boutros Boutros-Gali. 
Despite his expertise in foreign affairs, he was only appointed to the 
President’s cabinet as the deputy to the President’s Minister of For-
eign Affairs.247 Finally, after years of assisting Egypt’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, on January 1, 1992, Boutros Boutros-Gali was ap-
 
 242. See id. art. 25. 
 243. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 92, at 92. Note that this law was primarily enacted to 
keep the Muslim Brotherhood from forming a political party. But, its members have exerted 
tremendous political influence by forming coalitions with opposition parties. See id. at 117.  
 244. See id. at 118. The majority of parliamentary seats are filled by members of the Na-
tional Democratic Party (NDP). See id. They typically occupy over three hundred of the avail-
able 418 seats. See id. While the NDP is not affiliated with fundamentalists, they were the 
overwhelming majority in Parliament when the Constitution was amended to include the 
shari´a as “the main” source of legislative law. See id. at 113. Thus, even though it is possible 
for a Copt to be a member of the NDP and run for parliament as a member of their party, it is 
unlikely that a Copt would feel comfortable running for office in the party that made such a 
drastic change to the constitution. 
 245. Jasper Mortimer, Copts Find Road to Advancement Closed: Egypt’s Christians Feel 
Shut Out of Government, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 11, 1999, at A29, available in 1999 
WL 4077329. It is interesting to note, however, that all political parties covet the Coptic vote: 
“Even the Moslem Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt but whose activities have long been 
tolerated, has joined the bandwagon. In a declaration entitled ‘Address to the People’ issued in 
early May, 1995, the group underlined its ‘condemnation of terrorism and support for com-
plete civil rights for Copts.’” Mona Salem, Opposition Parties Line Up To Woo Egypt’s Chris-
tians, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 24, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7807110. 
 246. See 17 HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 998. Traditionally, mayors of vil-
lages, for example, were elected positions. Now the law requires that these positions be ap-
pointed by the government. See Ibrahim, Governance and Structural Adjustment, supra note 
150, at 167 (citing a law passed in April 1994 “doing away with the election system for village 
mayors”). 
 247. Christopher Walker, Egyptian Copts Flee Islamic Extremism, TIMES LONDON, Mar. 
10, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10562086. 
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pointed Secretary-General of the United Nations.248 In short, for 
Egypt to create a society more tolerant of religious pluralism, reli-
gious organizations must be given a greater opportunity to voice 
their concerns both to government and as representatives of the gov-
ernment.249 
 (4) Conversion from Islam to Christianity. Article 18(1)-(2) of 
the CCPR provides: 
(1) Everyone shall have a right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. . . . 
(2) No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice.250 
In addition, Article 12(2) states: “Everyone shall be free to leave any 
country, including his own.”251 
Despite these provisions under the CCPR, Muslim converts to 
Christianity have been arrested and detained under Egypt’s “state of 
emergency” laws.252 In addition, Egyptians are required by law to 
identify their religion on their birth certificate, driver’s license, travel 
papers, and employment applications.253 Moreover, the law not only 
requires Egyptian citizens to display their religion on their identifica-
tion cards but Muslims who have converted to Christianity are not 
permitted to change the status of their religion on their card from 
 
 248. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, supra note 117. 
 249. See Ibrahim, The Changing Face, supra note 111, at 79 (arguing that the govern-
ment’s belatedness in both socially upgrading depressed areas of Egypt, including Upper 
Egypt, and conversing with opposition parties and professional associations has been a major 
reason for the dramatic increase in violence). 
 250. CCPR, supra note 122, art. 18(1)-(2). 
 251. See id. art. 12(2). 
 252. See, e.g., 15A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1416. There is no penalty 
under Egyptian law for a Christian to convert to Islam. See The Cry of the Egyptian Church, 
supra note 145. These converts are arrested and detained for threatening “social peace and 
intercommunal relations.” See id. Another example is that in August 1993 the government se-
curity police arrested a Copt for making photocopies of a book containing the conversion sto-
ries of Copts from Islam and formally charged him with violating the Penal Code. See 18 
HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1171.  
 253. See John Lancaster, Egypt’s Endangered Christians; After Violent Attacks, Ancient 
Coptic Minority Fears It Has Become the Target of Islamic Militants, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 
1997, at A12, available in 1997 WL 10007936. 
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Islam to Christianity.254 Finally, there have been instances of Muslim 
converts to Christianity being arrested in the Cairo airport because of 
a law that forbids such converts from traveling abroad.255 These trav-
eling restrictions were eventually lifted, but the converts’ names are 
kept on an “immigration lookout list.”256 Treating Muslims and 
Copts differently simply because of their religious preference is un-
healthy for a society trying to preserve religious pluralism and com-
bat nonstate discrimination against such individuals. 
 (5) Press laws. The CCPR states: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice.257 
In 1996, the Egyptian parliament passed a new “press law,” pro-
viding for all sorts of freedoms associated with the press, including 
“prohibition against racist policies, scorn for religions, [and] attack-
ing the beliefs of others.”258 Nevertheless, this “press law” also pro-
vided that the government could censor newspapers during “states of 
emergency.”259 Hence, censorship continues to be prevalent because 
Egypt has been in a “state of emergency” since 1981. Such censor-
ship has a detrimental effect on the religious human rights of Copts 
because it forbids negative information about the government from 
being published and prevents the international community from be-
coming more sensitive toward the Coptic situation. In addition, 
press censorship cuts off the ability of Islamists to vent their frustra-
tion and anger at the government through more peaceful means in-
stead of resorting to violence to convey their message. Thus, press 
censorship not only violates the CCPR and creates a society less  
 
 
 254. See 15A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1416-17; see also 17 HELSINKI 
ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 996. In 1997, a suit was filed “seeking removal of the religious 
affiliation category from identification cards.” 23A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 
1653. The resolution of this suit has not been reported. 
 255. See 18 HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1171. 
 256. See 23A HELSINKI ACCORDS, supra note 103, at 1653. 
 257. CCPR, supra note 122, article 19(2). 
 258. See Press Law No. 96 of 1996, reprinted in 3 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE 
EASTERN LAW 184 (Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 1996). 
 259. See id. 
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aware of its problems, but it also cuts off an important way for soci-
ety to express itself. 
3. Summary: the impact of the shari´a, the courts, and legislation on the 
religious human rights of the Copts 
A more plausible solution to violence in Egypt by nonstate actors 
is comprehensive legal reform. This may not include removing the 
1980 shari´a amendment from the Constitution, but it must clarify 
that the amendment will not be used to deprive any Egyptian citizen 
of religious human rights. In addition, despite Egypt’s Supreme 
Constitutional Court’s impressive treatment of religious human 
rights, other high courts in Egypt need to be reformed in such a way 
that religious human rights are given precedence over conflicting no-
tions of Islam. A successful legal reformation would also include eq-
uitable treatment in less visible areas of the law, including the issu-
ance of building permits, public education, government 
representation, conversion, and press laws. Religious organizations 
must be given more of a chance to voice their concerns both to gov-
ernment and as representatives of the government.260 Public educa-
tion must be unfettered by strong religious overtones.261 The press 
should be given more freedom to report on human rights abuses, 
and thereby awaken both Egypt’s and the international society’s 
awareness of these problems and work towards a comprehensive, yet 
sensitive, solution. Finally, to completely eradicate all forms of vio-
lent discrimination now used against the Copts, these legal reforms 
must be followed by comprehensive economic, social, and political 
reforms.262  
C. Models to Follow: Other Countries’ Solutions to Affirmative 
Treatment of Nonstate Discrimination 
This subpart briefly discusses the laws in three different countries 
that have recognized the government’s affirmative duty to protect 
religious minorities from nonstate discrimination, have enhanced 
those protections, and have provided an “effective remedy” for any 
religious discrimination that does occur. The laws in these three 
 
 260. See Ibrahim, The Changing Face, supra note 111, at 79. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. (arguing that Egypt will not be able to stem the tide of Islamic activism until 
there are comprehensive economic, social, and political reforms). 
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countries serve as models upon which Egypt can rely in reforming its 
own laws and enhancing its protection of Copts from nonstate dis-
crimination. The first nation, Ireland, is important because it shows 
how a country has chosen to affirmatively protect the religious hu-
man rights of its citizens by explicitly stating so in its Constitution. 
The next nation, the United States, exemplifies ways that Egypt can 
better protect the religious human rights of its citizens from nonstate 
discrimination by improving its treatment of victims of religious dis-
crimination and more thoroughly prosecuting the perpetrators of the 
discrimination. Finally, the last nation, Lebanon, shows how a coun-
try has chosen to automatically incorporate international human 
rights instruments into its legal system and give those instruments 
precedence over conflicting law. 
1. The Irish model 
Ireland has had a great deal of experience in confronting violence 
by nonstate actors against others because of religious affiliation. Ire-
land has chosen to confront this violence and to pursue its duty to 
protect its citizens from such through its constitution. For example, 
Article 40.3 of the Irish Constitution provides: 
(1)  The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practi-
cable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of 
the citizen. 
(2)  The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may 
from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate 
the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citi-
zen.263 
In addition to these rights, the Irish courts have found a related “un-
enumerated right” protected under the Constitution: “The right to 
freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment.”264 Thus, the Irish model is useful in showing how the gov-
ernment’s affirmative duty to protect its citizens from nonstate dis-
crimination is made concrete by making those protections an explicit 
part of the Irish Constitution. 
 
 263. Ronan Keane, The Role of the Judiciary in the Protection of Human Rights: The Irish 
Experience, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 219, 
222 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997). 
 264. See id. at 222. 
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2. The United States model 
The United States serves as a useful model because of its com-
prehensive treatment of the government’s affirmative duty to protect 
its citizens from continuous acts of nonstate discrimination and pro-
vide an “effective remedy” for victims of such discrimination. First, 
the United States’ courts protect the victim’s life, dignity, and pri-
vacy from nonstate discrimination in five ways: (1) by issuing “stay 
away orders” or “emergency protective orders”; (2) by setting bail 
for the accused based on that accused’s threat to public safety; (3) by 
notifying the victim if the nonstate actor is released on bail; (4) by 
prosecuting any threats of violence against the victim; and (5) by re-
locating the victim of the discrimination.265 Second, the United 
States has increased the likelihood of convicting nonstate and state 
perpetrators of discrimination. This has been accomplished through 
several methods: 
by changing the rules of evidence to allow relevant evidence to be 
admitted into the court, and by training prosecutors and using that 
training in specialized teams to ensure expertise. As to police abuses 
and misconduct, conviction of those that use legal authority to ter-
rorize and brutalize must be ensured through independent investi-
gations, and the incentives to act illegally must be removed 
through legislation and even through judicial remedies.266 
Third, the United States allows the victim of nonstate discrimina-
tion to actively participate in the judicial process. For example, vic-
tims are notified of the time and place of the court proceedings, and 
the victim is permitted to present information at a plea bargain or 
sentencing or parole hearing.267 Finally, the United States “demands 
that the victim should be made ‘whole’ financially.”268 This compen-
sation is first sought from the nonstate actor, and, if the offender has 
insufficient funds, the victim can seek compensation from the gov-
ernment.269 In summary, the United States provides a good model 
 
 265. See generally Michael E. Hartmann, Protection of Human Rights Through the Crimi-
nal Justice System: Protection and Participation of the Victims of Crime, and the Prosecution of 
Their Oppressors, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
161, 165-169 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997). 
 266. See id. at 177. 
 267. See generally id. at 186-90. 
 268. Id. at 192. 
 269. See id. at 192. 
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for Egypt to follow in affirmatively protecting the religious human 
rights of those discriminated against by nonstate actors. It is a dem-
onstration of how Egypt can effectively prosecute, and thereby deter, 
nonstate discrimination. 
2. The Lebanese model 
The final model, that of Lebanon, is useful because of how it has 
incorporated international guarantees of human rights into its own 
constitution and legislative laws. The manner in which these rights 
are incorporated into law and subsequently applied help define the 
boundaries of the government’s affirmative duty to protect religious 
human rights and the extent to which those rights are protected. 
Lebanon has enabled the automatic incorporation of international 
treaties into its legal system “by virtue of ratification by the Execu-
tive after consent of the Parliament.”270 After the treaty is incorpo-
rated into its legal system, “the provisions of the international trea-
ties have precedence over the provisions of the internal legislation 
pertaining to the same subject, that is, even if there isn’t any contra-
diction per se between the said provisions.”271 Thus, by these meth-
ods, Lebanon has made a clear commitment to affirmatively protect 
the religious human rights of its citizens.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Copts have been at home in Egypt for over 1900 years. 
Throughout their existence, Copts have enjoyed complete religious 
freedom at times and total repression at others. Currently, the Copts 
are facing increasing violations of their religious human rights by 
nonstate actors. Under the UDHR and CCPR, Egypt’s government 
has an affirmative duty to protect the Copts from such acts of dis-
crimination. However, Egypt’s affirmative duty to protect the Copts 
from nonstate discrimination cannot be satisfied by quicker re-
sponses, better investigations, or swifter prosecutions of these acts of 
discrimination. Instead, for Egypt to effectively combat this type of 
discrimination in the long run and create a society more tolerant of 
religious pluralism, Egypt must first eliminate all forms of discrimina-
 
 270. Georges J. Assaf, The Application of International Human Rights Instruments by the 
Judiciary in Lebanon, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 81, 85 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1997). 
 271. Id. at 86 (citations omitted). 
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tion from its Constitution, courts, and legislation. In addition, other 
reforms outside the scope of this Comment, including economic, so-
cial, and political changes, must be instituted for Egypt to stem the 
violent discrimination perpetrated by nonstate actors. 
Despite the comprehensive reforms that Egypt must undergo in 
the face of strong cultural and religious diversity, a society truly tol-
erant of religious pluralism can flourish in Egypt. Indeed, 
cultural [and religious] diversity is not incompatible with human 
rights; it is one of the byproducts, one of the purposes of human 
rights, particularly of religious human rights. Pluralism is insepara-
ble from the liberty that induces it. . . . What is universal in all so-
cieties is the need for the rule of law and the belief in human dig-
nity. What differs from culture to culture is how and why one gets 
to those conceptions.272 
By implementing the legal reforms suggested in this Comment, 
Egypt will come closer to realizing tolerance and religious pluralism 
in its society. In return, the Copts of Egypt will enjoy the full extent 
of their religious human rights. 
Scott Kent Brown II 
 
 
 
 272. Arzt, supra note 135, at 400. 
